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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WANDA SANDBERG; WANDA SANDBERG
Administratrix of the ESTATE of
WAYNE SANDBERG, Deceased; JEFFREY
SCOTT SANDBERG; SUSAN SANDBERG,
by WANDA SANDBERG, her Guardian,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

ROBERT D. KLEIN, AVALON KLEIN,
)
JANE DOE and all other persons
)
unknown claiming any right, title )
or interest in the real property )
described in Plaintiff's Complaint)
adverse to Plaintiffs' Ownership )
or any cloud upon Plaintiffs'
)
title thereto,
)
Defendants and
Respondents,
&

In the Matter of the ESTATE
of
WAYNE SANDBERG,
Deceased.

Case No. 15146

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-appellants filed this action to quiet title
to approximately 400 acres of real property situate in WashingLon County, Utah.

Defendants-respondents filed a counterclaim

seeking specific performance of an Option Agreement allegedly
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pertaining to some of the property.

For purposes of judicial

convenience, the lower court subsequently consolidated the
quiet title action with a probate proceeding involving the
same parties and issues.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was heard by the lower court on Motions

for Summary Judgment either to declare the Option Agreement of ,
no effect, or to find the same specifically enforceable.

On

March 25, 1977, the court entered the ORDER from which this
appeal is taken granting judgment in favor of Defendants on
their Counterclaim and decreeing specific performance of a
real estate purchase contract allegedly in conformity to the
Option Agreement presented by

~ef~ndants.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the summary judgment
entered against them on the grounds that the Option Agreement
is not a document susceptible of specific enforcement and that
the Option Agreement was not properly exercised.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In early 1962, the respondent, Mr. Robert Klein, a
man previously licensed in real estate, with a contractor's
license and over ten years' experience in the building and
subdividing business, came to the Sandberg home in Washine;ton County, Utah, with Orval Hafen, an attorney. 1

(Depo-

sition of Robert D. Klein, pp. 2-3, 17-18 [hereinafter DRK],
1

Notations to the record herein are to the civil case and
not the probate files consolidated therewith unless
otherwise specified.
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R. 397) (Deposition of Wanda S. Kurt, p. 6:12-15 [hereinafter
DWS]; R. 398)

As a result of initial negotiations, on April 4,

1962, Wayne Sandberg, now deceased, and his wife, Wanda Sandberg<, now Wanda Sandberg Kurt, entered into an Earnest Money
Receipt, which was essentially a preliminary offer to Robert D.
Klein to allow him to purchase certain real property located
in Washington County, Utah, (DWS, pp. 6, 7:20-24, 55:23,
R. 398; DRK 4:5, R. 397), described therein as follows:
All land owned by the sellers in Sections 21,
22, and 27, Township 42 South, Range 15 West,
S.L.M., consisting, so far as the parties can
determine at this time of approximately 500 acres
not including any water or water rights, and less
the following:
There is now a reservoir constructed by the City
of St. George on what the parties believe to be the
NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22, and there is an old
fence running north and south west of this reservoir. The sellers intend to reserve from said
sale all land in said Section 22 which lies east
of said fenceline, it being understood that the
exact line will have to be determined if and
when the option hereinafter mentioned is executed.
(R. 196)
The Earnest Money Receipt provided that the buyer had thirty
days "to enter into an option" on the terms as set forth therein
"and on such other terms as the parties hereto may agree."
(R. 197)

Moreover, the Earnest Money Receipt was specific-

ally referred to as a "preliminary contract" that of necessity
"[did] not contain all the terms and conditions either of the
option or the agreement to purchase, and that both of said
documents [would] contain the usual and customary provisions."
(R. 198)
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The April 4, 1962, Earnest Money Receipt

that

was supposed to remain open for thirty days was extended to
June 14, 1962, pursuant to a written addition to the document dated April 30, 1962.

On June 14, 1962, Robert Klein

paid $500.00 on the Earnest Money Receipt to further extend
the original thirty-day period.

Additional sums totalling

$3,500.00 were subsequently paid to prevent the option
granted by the Earnest Money Receipt from terminating until
December 14, 1964.

(Answers to Request for Admissions of

Robert D. Klein [hereinafter AnRK] No. 1, R. 66; Answers to
Requests for Admissions of Wanda Sandberg [hereinafter AnWS]
Nos. 2 & 3, R. 132)
On September 21, 1964, however, Robert Klein and
Wanda Sandberg, individually and as the legal representative
and heir-at-law of Wayne Sandberg, signed an Option Agreement
which agreement was drawn and prepared by Robert Klein.
(AnRK No. 14, R. 69)

At that time, as before, Mrs. Sandberg

was not represented by counsel.

By its terms, the Option Agreement formally ratified the terms and conditions of the earlier Earnest Money
Receipt "together with the modifications to which the parties
have agreed."

(R. 59)

The Option Agreement covered

[A]ll land owned by the Sellers in Section 21,
Section 22, and Section 27 of Township 42
South, Range 15 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, consisting of approximately 500 acres,
which property shall be more particularly described in Schedule A attached hereto, to be
signed by the parties and made a part hereof
for all purposes; not includin; any water or
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water rights, and excluding all land in the
Northeast one quarter of the Northeast one
quarter of Section 22, which lies East of the
old fence line, which runs North and Southwest
of the City of St. George Reservoir, said excluded property also to be more particularly
described in Schedule A attached hereto and
made a part hereof for all purposes.
(R. 59-60)
The "Schedule A" snoken of never came into existence and thus
was not incorporated into the Option Agreement as recited
therein; similarly, the description of the "excluded property"
is also nonexistent and not attached thereto.
Paragraph 3 of the Option Agreement recited those
payments necessary to keep the Option Agreement in effect
(R. 60-61) , while paragraph 4 contained provisions allowing for
the possible extension of the Option Agreement until 1982,
some eighteen years after the document was signed with no adjustment in the price for the land.

(R. 61)

It is not dis-

puted, however, that the last payment tendered to maintain
and keep the option in good st~nding was made on or before
December 14, 1970. That payment was for a six-month extension of the option until
the option expired.

~une

14, 1971, and, as of that date,

Thus, by the terms of the Option Agree-

ment the option would have had to have been exercised on or
before June 14, 1971, to create a binding contract.
Nos. 1, 4, 7, 9 & 13 R. 66-69; DWS 55:13-17, R. 398)

(AnRK
As of the last

payment on December 14, 1970, respondent Klein had paid
~~7.G00.0J

to maintain the option in good standing.
~aragraph

5 of the Option Agreement provided the

only method by which the option was to be exercised:
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5. The Buyer may exercise his right to purchase
this property for the sum of Two Hundred Dollars
($200.00) per acre at any time during the option
period, (including any extension period) by executing a contract to Durchase all or such part or
parts of the property as the parties may agree;
such contract shall provide as follows: (R. 61
(emphasis added))

Thereafter, several subparagraphs of paragraph 5 set forth
some of the terms and conditions to be provided in the contract.

For example, subparagraph Sb required a down payment

under the contract of "Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) (or
such other amount as the parties may agree) on said contract",
and paragraph Se provided for partial releases of contiguous
land selected by the buyer or otherwise as mutually agreed
by both parties.

(R. 62)

On March 12, 1971, while state appraisers were appraising the Sandberg property at $100. 00 per acre for probate
purposes, Mrs. Sandberg, at Robert Klein's request, authorized
James R. Brown, a Utah attorney, to represent her in a condemnation proceeding filed against her by Dixie Rural Electric
Association.

(DWS 27:9-18, R. 398, R. lOS)

In that same

authorization she assigned whatever proceeds were received
from those proceedings to Robert Klein, subject, of course,
to his proper exercise of the option.

(R. lOS; AnWS No. 10,

R. 13S)

On March 30, 1971, respondent Klein apparently
delivered to Wanda Sandberg a letter indicating "his intention of exercising the option of September 24, 1964."
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Petition for Order

Requi~ing

Administratrix To Execute

Deeds, and for Specific Performance of Contract, 1[14, Probate Record 57;R.71)

Respondent Klein has stated and the lower

court has ruled that the letter of March 30, 1971, together
with some verbal communication was the understanding of the
parties regarding the contract for purchase (AnRK. No. 11,
R. 68; Order of District Court [hereinafter Order] V7, R. 358),
and that Mrs. Sandberg knew that respondent "was purchasing
all of the property in my [his] letter."
R. 397)

(DRK. 13: 13-16;

That letter, unsigned in the record before the Court,

in pertinent part, states as follows:
[T]here are one or two matters that should be considered preparatory to my exercising the option and
the delivery of title to a portion of the land
designated by the option. -

My interpretation of the number of acres involved
essentially corresponds with yours, namely that the
land Wayne intended to sell lies west of the fence
line that you and I have both seen together. I
would like you to know that I can appreciate your
concern that thia line be agreed to by both of us.

If you think about it, descriptions along section or quarter section lines generally are more
easily handled. It is for this reason, after
careful review that I have discribed [sic] the
annexation description as indicated by the plat
which I am including with this letter. This description, within a few feet, corresponds with
the fence line that you and I have observed together when we last saw each other. [sic] This
I trust will correspond with your own interpretation sf what land you in fact believe you are
~rLling.
Should you still have some apprehension
that I am not aware of, I am sure that on a face
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to face basis and with the help of a surveyor
we can resolve fairly t:o each of ou:::- satisfaction
whatever diffenences [sic] of opinion we may
encounter.

I trust that the linen of the kind which I am
showing you at the tirne of delivery of this
letter will be all that will be required. You
will note that I am only proposing that land
be annexed which I am in fact buying from you.
(R. 71- 73)
The proposed annexation linen spoken of in the letter was executed by Robert Klein and Wanda Sandberg on April
5, 1971. (Affidavit of Robert D. Klein [hereinafter ARK] H4,
R. 39) That same linen bearing the subsequent approval of the
St. George City Council appears in the record on page 109 and
in the probate record at page 83.

BO's in the probate record)

(Note there are two set of

According to respondent Klein,

this plat dealt with the real property which was the subject
matter of this lawsuit.

(ARK H4; R. 339)

Specifically,

respondent Klein has stated, apparently to confirm the letter
of March 30th' s language, that "he was buying approximately
450 acres described in the Holidaire Lands annexation plat and
the option agreement dated September 21, 1964," which lands
respondent Klein caused to be annexed to the City of St.
on May 17, 1971.

Gear~

(Answers to Request for Admissions, First Set

and Interrogatories, Fourth Set of Robert D. Klein [hereinafter
An1I4RK] 2c, R. 151; ARK H4, R. 339-40; Memorandum of Points
and Authorities of Robert D. Klein [hereinafter ~1RK], R. 289)
On

June 3, 1971, respondent Klein drafted a check

bearing the notation "down payment to commence June 15 agree-
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ment 1971."

(R. 64)

This check was tendered to Mrs. Sand-

berg on June 7, 1971, as the down payment on the contract
contemplated by paragraph 5 of the September 21, 1964,
Option Agreement and not as payment under paragraph 3d of
the Option Agreement to keep it in good standing.
2-5, R. 67; R. 61)

(AnRK Nos.

Respondent Klein sucessfully asserted

before the lower court that this act, coupled with the delivery of the prior letter of March 30, 1971, exercised the
option.

(MRK lf8, R. 271; Order 117, R. 358)
Though respondent Klein had requested a release

of 55 acres in his letter of March 30, 1971, (R. 71-73), Mrs.
Sandberg conveyed only 40 acres to repondent Klein, executing
a Warranty Deed prepared by him.

(AnRK No. 7, R. 68; R. 111)

The conveyance, in particularity, dealt with the
SE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 21, Township 42 South,
Range 15 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian
(R. 111)

All Mrs. Sandberg recalls was that respondent Klein wanted
this property because he already had it sold.
R. 398)

(DWS 26:13-20,

Respondent Klein did sell that property, apparently

all 40 acres, to one Harman Johnson for $700.00 per acre.
(DRK 11:20-28, R. 397)
Although the check dated June 3, 1971, bore the inscription "down payment on June 15, agreement 1971", at no
time prior to June 15, 1971, did the respondent execute a
contract to purchase "all or such part or parts of the property as the parties may agree" as required by paragraph 5
of the Option Agreement.

(R. 64; AnRK No. 10, R. 68; R. 61)
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In fact, there is no agreement of June 15, 1971, in the
record because no such agreement exists.

It is important

to note that respondent Klein stipulated that ''at no time
duri?g her contacts with Defendant [respondent) in this
case did she [Wanda Sandberg] request the Defendant [respondent) to abstain from submitting contracts required pursuant
to the 1964 option agreement' entered into by the parties.
(R. 355; Transcript [hereinafter T) 7:12-14, R. 399)
As no payments were made to extend the option after
December 14, 1970, the period for exercising the option terminated on June 14, 1971.

(Option Agreement t3, R. 60-61;

R. 339; AnRK No. 1, R. 66-67)
In April of 1972, some ten months later, respondent
Klein met with Mrs. Sandberg purportedly to finalize arrangements with her to complete a survey to determine the exact
acreage of the Holidaire Lands Addition to St. George so
that the real estate contract contemplated by paragraph 5
of the Option Agreement could be drafted and the annual
installment required under that proposed document computed.

(MRK pt. 10, R. 272)

Mrs. Sandberg, however, concluded that

after her conveyance of forty acres, and, in the absence of
the June 14, 1971, and December 14, 1971, payments under
paragraph 3d of the Option Agreement, that the Option Agreement had terminated.

(DWS 28-29, 33:26-30, R. 398) Respondent

Klein, nonetheless, apparently requested and paid Howard G
Stevens, a registered land surveyor, for a survey in the
entire NE 1/4 of Section 22, T42S, Rl5W, of a fenceline
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which respondent Klein had shown to Mr. Stevens which Klein
apparently believed to be the fenceline referred to in the
Option Agreement and Earnest Money Receipt.

(Affidavit of

Howard G. Stevens, [hereinafter AHS] 117, R. 264)

Meanwhile

on May 2, 1972, respondent Klein's attorney, Leo A. Jardine,
Esq., wrote Royal K. Hunt, Esq., who had been retained by
Mrs. Sandberg adjunct to the probate proceedings, a letter.
The pertinent part of that letter pertaining to land descriptions reads as follows:
The parties have also tentatively agreed as to
the property description which, in our opinion,
is the only matter yet to be fully resolved
but can be resolved and determined by application of the provisions of the contract and the
written notations made by the parties on that
plat or from a physical survey of the property.
(R. llS)

The "contract" spoken above was the Option Agreement, because
on May 2, 1972, there was still 90 contract as contemplated
by paragraph 5 of the Option Agreement in existence.
Howard Stevens completed the survey requested by
respondent Klein on May 12, 1972.

(AHS

~8,

R. 264)

On May

16, 1972, respondent Klein executed as grantee and submitted
to Wanda Sandberg for her signature as granter a Real Estate
Purchase Contract which was alleged to be "in every way consistent with the terms and conditions of the Option Agreement."

(MRK pt. 10, R. 272)

The lower court also took this

position, that is, that "[t]he real estate Agreement, submitted by Robert D. Klein to Wanda Sandberg, was in conformity
both as to description and consideration with the option
agreement."

(Order ,4, R. 358)
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The real estate purchase contract submitted to
Mrs. Sandberg by respondent Klein appears in the record on
pages 117-121.

Although the Option Agreement only reserved

to the sellers [Sandberg] some land contained in the
"Northeast one quarter of the Northeast one quarter of section 22" (R. 60), the real estate purchase contract reserved
for the sellers land not only in the NE 1/4 of the NE 1/4
of Section 22, but in the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 as well.

This

additional reservation to Mrs. Sandberg was the result of
Mr. Stevens' survey of a fence line shown to him by respondent Klein.

Thus, respondent Klein's "conforming contract",

in seeking to convey only part of Section 22, in the following language, left Mrs. Sandberg with more land than had
been reserved for her by the Option Agreement, and was an
attempted exercise for only part of the property subject to
the option.
Beginning in an existing fenceline at its
intersection with the north line of Section
22, Tl+2S, Rl5W, SLB&M which point is 12. 2
feet west from a stone mound marking the NE
corner NE 1/4 NE 1/4 said Section 22 and
running thence S 0° 14' W 1338.5 feet along
said fence line, thence S. 89 ° 36' 30" E 41+3. 0
feet along said fence, thence S 10° 09' 30"
W 405.0 feet along said fence, thence S 12°
40' 10" W 910.49 feet, more or 12ss, along
said fence to the South line NE 1/4 said Section 22, thence west 1380 feet to the SW corner said NE 1/4, thence north 2640 feet to the
N 1/4 corner said Section 22, thence east
1307.8 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 86.84 acres, more or less.
(R. 121)
Simply stated, there is land in the SE 1/4 of the
~equested

NE

1/4 not

from Mrs. Sandberg by respondent Klein, and, there-

fore, specifically reserved for her by respondent Klein's
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Real Estate Purchase Contract.

This fact is not affected by

Mrs. Sandberg's conveyance of 40 acres in June of 1971, as
that land was entirely in Section 21.

(AnRK No. 7, R. 68;

R. 111; R. 119)

Of course, respondent Klein can state that just
such an exercise was authorized by paragraph 5 of the Option
Agreement which in setting forth the manner of the Option
Agreement's exercise called for a contract "to purchase all
or such part or parts of the property as the parties may
agree."

(R. 60)

Nonetheless, while the parties theoretically

might have agreed to any description of land, Klein himself
has not been consistent.

For example, it is difficult to

reconcile the fact that the real estate purchase contract
covers approximately 70 acres less than the Holidaire Lands
Addition to the City of St. George, all of which respondent
Klein indicated he intended to .buy in his letter of March 30,
1971.

R. 289)

(R. 73; ARK U4, R. 339; An1I4RK 2c, R. 151; MRK,

Stranger still is the lower court's holding that

this letter, unsigned in the record before the Court, along
with the June 7, 1971 payment of $2,000.00 exercised the
Option Agreement giving rise to the real estate purchase
contract, which covers less than all of that annexation.
(Order

,~

4 and 5, R. 358)
A check dated June 1, 1972, for the sum of $8,627.84

with the notation "1972 annual principal and interest, and
contract payment" was ultimately tendered to Mrs. Sandberg
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presumably pursuant to the aforementioned unilaterallv
drafted real estate purchase contract.

(R.

122)

Receiving no response, respondent Klein on June 13, 1972,
caused F. Clayton Nelson, Esq., to hand deliver to Mrs.
Sandberg a cashier's check in the amount of $68,359.04.
(R. between 122 and 123, unnumbered; DRK 6-8, R. 397) Along
with that check was another unsigned letter which stated,
inter alia:
Please find enclosed herewith a cashier's
check in the amount of $68,359.04 which constitutes payment in full for the 431.84
acres (40 acres of which you have delivered)
which l have purchased from you and Wayne
under our original Ear~est Money Agreement
dated April 4, 1962 . . . (R. 124 (emphasis
added))
Respondent Klein probably failed to notify Attorney Nelson
that Mrs. Sandberg was already represented by an attorney.
(DRK 8, R. 397)

On July 6, 1972, respondent Klein, as president of
Capital Enterprises, Inc., sent a letter

demandin~

that Mrs.

Sandberg deliver deeds to some property described as "Exhibit A" in said letter, but not part of the record. 2 (R. 125)
Five days later, on July 11, 1972, Mrs. Sandberg's attorney,
Royal K. Hunt, Esq., returned the tender of $68,359.04 along
with a letter indicating that the option had terminatec prior
to the tender of the June 1972 real estate purchase contract.
(R. 126)
2

Presumably the "Exhibit A" spoken of would be the same
"Exhibit A" as is attached to the ~eal estate purchase consigned by respondent Klein on :'1ay 16, 1972. (R. 121)
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On AprU 3, 197L1, Mrs. Sandberg f:i,led an action to
quiet title to the real property

ultim~tely

claimed by respon-

dent Klein as set forth in "Exhibit A" to his real estate
purc~ase

contract.

(R. 1-3, 121)

Therafter, acting on the

advice of her attorney and for tax purposes, Mrs. Sandberg
quit-claimed whatever interest she had in all of the lands
mentioned in the original Earnest Money Receipt to a limited
partnership in which her children are the limited partners.
(DWS 48-49, R. 398)

Subsequently, all parties named as de-

fendants to the quiet title action have admitted that whatever right or title they have to those lands described in
"Exhibit A" to respondent Klein's real estate purchase contract
is claimed by and through respondent Klein.
On the 17th day of January, 1977, the Honorable J.
Harlan Burns, District Judge, set the case for trial.

Some

two weeks later, on February 7, 1977, respondent Klein
filed a counterclaim dated February 4th stating that "the
property described as "Exhibit A" in the real estate purchase
contract was that certain real property referred to in both
the Earnest Money Receipt and Option Agreement.

(R. 121,

170; Counterclaim of Robert D. Klein [hereinafter CRK] VVl,
3, 4 and 6, R. 166-168)
Concurrently with the filing of respondent's
counterclaim, Mrs. Sandberg filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Subsequently, a similar motion was filed by respondent
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Klein.

Upon counsel's stipulation as to the facts,

3

the

motions were heard on March 15, 1977, by Honorable Don V.
Tibbs, District Judge, sitting in Washington County due to
the illness of Judge Burns.

3 A stipulation as to the facts of this case was entered
at the hearing on the motions for sunnnary judgment.
From
the record, however, it is unclear what the parties stipulated. Appellants believe the stipulation was as to the
existence of certain documents, the contents, dates, and signatures thereto if existent and as to the date and fact of
receipt and delivery of the various docu.~ents.
The stipulation was made at the insistence
of the court .
. . . are you prepared to stipulate that this case
may be submitted to the Court as a question of
law based upon your statement of facts as set
forth in your Motion for Summary Judgment?
(T 6:12-15.)
As stated in the above excerpt, the court apparently
felt that the salient facts were set out in the memoranda in
support of the various motions.
If you are willing to stipulate that it is a
question of law based upon the fact as set
forth in your respective motions. ( T 6: 26-29.)
The rejective counsel, however, felt that the
motion was submitted on the basis of all the materials in
the file.
MR COWLEY:
Your Honor, I don't believe there
is any dispute as to the facts, and I've traveled down here to argue the motion, and we are
willing to submit it on the basis of the materials in the file.
(T 6:20-24.)
MR COWLEY: Your Honor, I think maybe we om;ht
to clear up by the record one more bit on this,
and that is that it is subIT.itted on the evidence
before the Court in the file at this time and
that this hearing is going to be an argument on
the law and not the introduction of any further
testimony or evidence.
THE COURT:

That is my impression.

MR. THOMPSON:
That is my impression.
(T 6:28-8:5)
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ARGUMENT
PART_9N~

- PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS
POINT I
(Procedural)

THE SCOPE OF JUDIC~AL REVIEW ENCOMPASSES
BOTH LEGAL AND FACTUAL ISSUES
In equitable actions appellate review traditionally
encompasses both the law and the facts.

This broad scope of

review is warranted because the original trial involved no
finder of fact other than a judge, so the appellate court may
easily place itself in the position of the trier of fact,
which is not possible in review of jury trials.

Some juris-

dictions have even adopted a trial de novo review of equity
cases in their supreme courts.

See, e.g., Smith v. Vehrs,

242 P.2d 586(0re. 1952).
Utah, while not providing for a trial de novo procedure in equitable proceedings', does provide for appellate
review of the record

on both legal and factual issues.

This scope of review of equity cases is founded in the Utah
Constitution.
The appeal shall be upon the record made
in the court below ... In equity cases the
appeal may be on questions of both law
and fact ...
(Utah Const. art. 8, §9).

The subject matter of the stipulation is therefore
difficult to ascertain, but appellants will proceed on the
basis that the operative physical facts evidenced by the
file were the subject of the stipulation and that the inferences therefrom, with questions of intent, understanding,
and belief were not conceded by either party.
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Essentially the same language is found in Rule 72(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In equity cases the appeal may be on questions
of both law and fact.
Thus, where the decision below was bottomed in equity and
where the appellant questions the findings of fact, it is
the duty of the appellate court to review the accuracy of
both the findings of fact and conclusions of law.

This is

not a judicial burden that can be passed over lightly in an
effort to get at the "real arguments".

In the instant case,

appellants believe that judicial cognizance of this rule may
be requisite to their obtaining a full and fair hearing on
the facts and issues of the case.
Under Article VIII, Section IX, Constitution
of Utah, it is both ~he duty and prerogative
of this court in an equitable action to review the law and the facts and make its own
findings and substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court. (Mitchell v. ~itchell,
527 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 1974)).
See also Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R.
1416 (1928).
That this Court has such broad review power is
evident by the customary appellate disposition of equity
cases where the evidence is not found lacking.

Generally,

this Court has not remanded equity cases after appellate review, but rather has entered or directed judgment.
In view, therefore, that this is purely an
equitable proceeding which comes to this
court upon questions of both law and fact,
we have the power, and it is our duty, to
either make findings and render judgment in
accordance with the facts and the law applicable thereto, or direct that such findings
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and judgment be made and entered by the
court below. (Johnson v. Seagull Inv. Co.,
65 Utah 424, 237 P.945, 948 (1925).
See also St. George and Washington Canal Co. v. Hurricane Canal
Co., 93 Utah 262, 72 P.2d 642 (1937).

As was stated in a

c-e.-:c!'r Oklahoma case, Matter of Reyna, 546 P.2d 622,

(Okla.

1976):
In a case of equitable cognizance, the
Supreme Court may weigh the evidence and
enter such judgment as the trial court
should have rendered.
(546 P.2d at 625).
Entry of judgment by the appellate court is made
following th2 review of equity cases because the appellate
court has full power to find the facts, make conclusions of
law, and enter judgment.

Of course, where the court feels

there is more necessary evidence available, not in the record,
it may remand for further taking of evidence, either retaining the case for proceedings after the further evidence is
gathered or remanding it entirely for both findings and conclusions in the lower court.
In this case, the parties stipulated at the hearing
on the motions for summary judgment that they would submit
the case on the evidence in the file at that date.
8:5)

(T 7:28-

Appellants contend that the findings entered on the

order appealed from do not reflect the facts as stipulated.
For this reason, review of the factual, as well as legal
ia6U~b 1b

sougl1t by the appellants.

It is the duty of this

Court to make independent findings and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.
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POINT II
(Procedural)
APPLICABLE STA.'1DARDS FOR REVIEW
FAVOR THE APPELLANT IN THIS CASE
Because of the different nature of the proceedings
which respectively result in summary judgment and judgment
after trial, the standards for review of each type of judgment are different.

A presumption of validity attaches to

a judgment after trial, whereas summary judgments must be
strictly scrutinized to ensure their propriety.
a.

The Presump_tio~ Favoring Validity of Judgment After
Trial Is Not A~plicable in This Case.
Because of the advantageous position of the judge

as a trier of fact, viewing and evaluating the credibility
of witnesses, the trial court's judgment after trial is generally presumed valid.

On review, the evidence must clearly

preponderate against the findings of fact in order for an
appellate court to reverse the trial court's order.
Stanley v.

Stanl~.

In

97 Utah 520, 94 P.2d 465 (1939), Justice

Wolfe, concurring specially on this issue, noting the existence of many statements of this presumption in Utah case
pr~cedent,

concluded that whatever presumption of validity

was to be given the trial judge's findings was due to his
presence at the trial.
In Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P. 2d 513,
520, 101 A.L.R. 532, a well considered case, it
was stated:
'After a can' f:.:l ,_·eadin:; of the
entire testimony of this witness, and weighing
the same along with the admitced facts in the
case, we do not feel satisfied that the finding
ought to be disturbed. The trial judge did
not accept the testimony of this witness in full.
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The trial judge had a better opportunity from
seeing and hearing the witness than we have
from merely reading the transcript to appraise
his credibility and to determine what weight
would be given to his testimony. The opinion
of the trial judge is therefore entitled to
some weight with us.'
Other cases containing similar expressions
are as follows: Williams v. Peterson, 86 Utah
526, 46 P.2d 674; Silver King Consol. Mining
Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 297, 39 P.2d 682; Corey
v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.2d 940; Consolidated
Wagon & Machine Co. v. Kay, 81 Utah 595, 21 P.2d
836; Holman v. Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 274 P.
457; Warner v. Tyng Warehouse Co., 71 Utah 303,
265 P. 748; Ephraim Willow Creek Irr. Co. v.
Olson, 70 Utah 95, 258 P. 216; Shulder v. Dickson,
66 Utah 418, 243 P. 377; Jenkins v. Nicolas, 63
Utah 329, 226 P. 177; McKellar Real Estate & Investment Co. v. Paxton, 62 Utah 97, 218 P. 128;
Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 61 Utah 298, 212 P. 526;
Bracken v. Chadburn, 55 Utah 430, 185 P. 1021;
Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53 Utah 10, 177
P. L~l8; Campbell v. Gowans, 35 Utah 268, 100 P.
397, 23 L.R.A. ,N.S., 414, 19 Ann.Cas. 660 (followed in Utah Com. & Savings Bank v. Fox, 44 Utah
323, 140 P. 660; and Little v. Stringfellow,
46 Utah 576, 151 P. 347): Fares v. Urban, 46 Utah
609, 151 P. 57; Froyd v. Barnhurst, 83 Utah 271,
28 P. 2d 135; Paxton v .· Paxton, 80 Utah 540, -15
P.2d 1051; Thomas v. Butler, 77 Utah 402, 296 P.
597; Clark v. Clark, 74 Utah 290, 279 P. 502;
Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P. 313 (and
cases cited); Singleton v. Kelly, 61 Utah 277,
212 P. 63 (and cases cited); Rieske v. Hoover,
53 Utah 87, 177 P. 228.

The reason then that we have the expressions
that in order to reverse there must be shown a
'clear preponderance' or 'fair preponderance' of
the evidence the other way or that we must 'bear
in mind legal presumptions in favor of the judgment' etc., is because of this recognition that
the lower court had the witnesses before it and
was better able to judge of their credibility.
(94 P.2d at 468).
See also T~~00cs Highlands v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481 (Utah
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The presumption

favo~ing

the trial court's find-

ings because of his ability to judge the credibility of
witnesses is obviously not applicable in the instant case
where no witnesses were presented and the judgment was
made on the "cold record."

In this case, an appellate

court is as well suited as the trial court to evaluate the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence because
the method of presentation of evidence is identical.
b.

In Appeals From Summll£Y_ Judgments Inferences Are to be
Drawn Favorably to the Appellant.
At the hearing resulting in the order from which

this appeal is taken, two motions for summary judgment were
under consideration.

Appellants moved for summary judgment

on their complaint and against respondent on his counterclaim.
Respondent moved for summary judgment on his counterclaim.
The court was required to consider, in each motion
for surrnnary judgment, the evidence and inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to the party opposing that particular motion.

The court found against the appellants on

their motion for summary judgment and found for the
respondent on his motion.

Apparently, the court found that

viewing the evidence and inferences therefrom most favorably
to the appellants, the respondent was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.

It is incredible that the lm·1er court could

find, before one witness had taken the stand, that the evidence in the file considered favorably to the appellants
met the high evidentiary standard required to support a
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decree for specific performance in favor of the respondent,
viz, free from doubt, vagueness and ambiguity.

Pitcher v.

Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967).
In this review, this Court also must consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs-appellants,
drawing all inferences in their favor.
The pertinent inquiry is whether under any view
of the facts the plaintiff could recover. It
is acknowledged that in the face of a motion
for dismissal on summary judgment, the plaintiff is entitled to have the trial court, and
this court on review, consider all of the evidence which plaintiff is able to present and
every inference and intendment fairly arising
therefrom in the light most favorable to him.
(Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific Railroad Com~· 7 Utah 2d 53, 57, 318 P.2d 339 (1957)
(footnote omitted)).
c.

Standards for Review Favor the Appellant in This Case.
This Court, in review of the summary judgment below

decreeing specific performance,, must consider both the facts
and the law in this case.

The general presumption in favor

of a trial court's findings does not apply as there was no
observation of witnesses to afford the trial court that presumption.

Further, the nature of an appeal from summary

judgment requires that the Court consider the evidence
and inferences in a light most favorable to appellants.

Thus,

this Court has a duty to consider the issues of both law
and fact, to consider those issues without favor toward
the findings below, and to draw inferences in favor of the
appellant.
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POINT III
(Evidentiary)
A HIGH EVIDENTIARY STANDARD MUST BE :1ET
TO SUPPORT A DECREE FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMA.~CE
The nature of the remedy of specific performance
requires that the respondent meet a high evitlentiary standard to justify a decree in his favor.

This is necessary

because courts cannot create rights between parties; they
may only confirm and enforce existing rights.

The courts

therefore require clear and certain proof as to all material
terms of a contract before enforcement will be decreed.

A

recent Utah case, Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368,
423 P.2d 491, 493 (1967), has succinctly stated these requirements:
In speaking of certain terms required for
specific performance, the author in 49 Am.Jur.,
Specific Performance, Section 22, at page 35
uses this language:
The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness, and ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to
conjecture or to be supplied by the court. It
must be sufficiently certain and definite in its
terms to leave no reasonable doubt as to what
the parties intended, and no reasonable doubt
of the specific thing equity is called upon to
have performed, and it must be sufficiently
certain as to its terms so that the court mav
enforce it as actually made by the parties. - A
greater degree of certainty is required for
specific performance in equity than is necessary
to establish a contract as the basis of an action
at law for damages.
As noted in Pitcher, a very high degree of proof is required.

71 Am.Jur. 2d Specific Performance §208 (1973)
states the standard as follows:
Where an action is brought for specj_fic performance, the established rule is that more
than a mere preponderance of testimony is
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required to establish the existence of the contract when its existence is denied. In order
that specific performance of a contract may be
decreed, the evidence of the making of the contract must be clear and convincing, or as stated
in some cases, clear, cogent, and convincing, or
strong and conclusive.
This burden of clear and definite proof must be met as to each
element of the contract.
Specific performance cannot be required unless
all terms of the agreement are clear. The court
cannot compel the performance of a contract which
the parties did not mutually agree upon.
(Pitcher,
~. at 493, citing Bowman v. Reyburn, 155 Colo.
8--z-;-T70 P.2d 271 (1946)).
In Pitcher, specific performance sought on an earnest
money agreement was denied because a map designating the land
to be conveyed was never attached thereto as recited.

The

contract as written was incomplete and therefore not a proper
subject for specific enforcement.
The Bowman opinion,

re~erred

to in Pitcher, explained

the rationale for such strict requirements of proof, citing
Adams v. Henderson, 168 U.S. 573, 18 S.Ct. 179, 42 L.Ed. 584
(1897) :
'Equity,' this court said in Hunt v. Rousmaniere's
Adm'rs, 1 Pet. 1, 14, 7 L.Ed. 27, 'may compel
parties to perform their agreements, when fairly
entered into, according to their terms; but it
has no power to make agreements for parties, and
then compel them to execute the same. The former
is a legitimate branch of its jurisdiction, and
in its exercise is highly beneficial to society.
The latter is without its authority, and the
exercise of it would be highly mischievous in
its consequences.'

[I]t must be clearly establish~d that the demanded
performance is in accordance with the actual
agreement of the parties. (170 P.2d at 276).
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In this case, it is not clear that any contract
has arisen.

The terms of the "contract" are in may respects

vague and uncertain.

The Option Agreement, upon which re-

spondent bases his claim against Mrs. Sandberg was never
completed as contemplated by the parties.

Not only has re-

spondent failed to prove a clear mutual understanding on
unambigous terms, he has failed to prove the existence of
a contract.

And certainly his proof is not clear and con-

vincing.
Beyond the deficiency of proof, a variance of
proof from the pleadings is fatal.

Respondent alle8ed in

his counterclaim that the real estate purchase contract he
drafted represents the agreement he has with Mrs. Sandberg
and that the property described as "Exhibit A" in said contract was that certain property referred to in both the
Earnest Money Receipt and Option Agreement.
CRK n1, 3, 4 and 6, R. 166-168)

(R. 121, 170;

Thus, if this court finds

that the real estate purchase contract is materially different from the Option Agreement, it must reverse, for that
reason alone, and respondent would not be entitled to a decree.
In an action for specific performance the proof
must conform to the pleading. Accordingly,
plaintiff must prove the contract as laid in
the bill and he cannot recover on some other
contract .
(81 C.J.S. Specific Performance
§139c (1953)).

Appellants contend that the deficiency and variance
of proof require reversal of the judgment below.
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POINT IV
(Evident i ary)
UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
ONLY THE EAR.NEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OPTION AG!U:EMENT
MAY BE CONSIDERED AS COMPETENT EVIDENCE AGAINST MRS. SANDBERG
In the present case, the documents presented by
respondent as the basis of his claim for specific performance include the Earnest Money Receipt of April
and the Option Agreement of September 21, 1964.
and 3, R. 166)

4, 1962
(CRK VV 1

The lower court relied on those documents

and letter of March 30, 1971, was exercising the option and
forming an enforceable contract.

Apparently these documents,

in the mind of the lower court, constituted a sufficient
memorandum of sale under the Statute of Frauds to grant
specific performance.
The Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. 25-5-1 et
seq., declares certain classes of agreements (designated by
subject matter) invalid unless such agreements are in writing and signed by the party to be charged.

The rationale

of requiring a signed writing is basically for evidentiary,
cautionary, and protective reasons.
Contracts for the conveyance of land are covered
by the statute.

The statute requires that the contract

designate the parties, identify the land to be conveyed,
recite the consideration therefor, and contain the signature
of at least the party to be charged.

The effect of the

statute is to exclude all evidence of a contract which is
not in

writiri~

reo":~"'r;ients

o:nci signed by the party to be charged.

The

of the statute are thus more stringent than
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and independent from those of the parol evidence rule.
The parol evidence rule only excludes evidence of prior
and contemporaneous statements proferred to vary or contradict the terms of a written instrument, but it does
allow evidence of agreements subsequent to the writing
and allows extrinsic evidence to clarify a writing.
The statute of frauds, however, effectually prohibits parol evidence which would add to or contradict an
existing writing or evidence a separate agreement, whether
prior, contemporaneous, or subsequent, by forbidding judicial
enforcement of such terms or agreements.

Therefore, as to

contracts designated within the statute of frauds, parol evidence is admissable only to clarify the writing, not to
add to or subtract from it.
The requirement of a signature of the party to be
charged is made to ensure the validity of the alleged contract.

It is often said that only the signature of the party

to be charged is required because the other party admits
the contract by suing thereon and seeking the benefits therefrom.

It is also generally accepted that parol evidence

may show acceptance of a written option because a true acceptance adds no terms to the option; otherwise such "acceptance"
would amount to a counteroffer.

37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of

§281 (1943).
Where separate writings each signed by the party
to be charged are available, they together may constitute
a sufficient memorandum.

Or, a writing signed by the pa.rt:y
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to be charged referring to an unsigned writing may create
a valid memorandum by incorporation.

However, "[a] paper

signed by the party to be charged cannot be incorporated in
a paper not signed by him by a reference in the latter

37 C.J.S., Frauds, Statute of §178

[unsigned docur:ient]."

(1943).
Therefore, the letter of March 30, 1971, cannot be
considered as a memorandum to be held against Mrs. Sandberg.
Only the Earnest

~1oney

Receipt and Option Agreement may be

relied on in a claim 2_gainst her for only those documents
bear her signature.

Respondents apparently realized this

and pled only those documents in their counterclaim.

The

lower court failed to realize that the letter of March 30,

1971, was incompetent evidence as to any claim against Mrs.
Sandberg and instead considered it as forming some of the material terms of the "contract" sought to be enforced against Mrs.
Sandberg.

Of course, that letter may be admissible for the

alleged purpose of showing that Klein exercised the option in
accordance with its terms, but it may neither add to, alter,
or subtract from the contractual

liability of Mrs. Sandberg.

4

The case of Lewis v. Elliot Bay Lodging Co., 112
Wash. 83, 191 P. 803 (1920), is analagous to the present

4While considering the effect of the Statute of Frauds
it sho,_,ld be noted, particularly with respect to the argument
"'' Lite lack of mutuality under the contract allegedly formed
by the Option Agreement, and the letter of March 30, 1971,
that there is no evidence that the March 30, 1971, letter was
ever signed by Klein.
No copies of that document in the record
appear with his signature.
See R. 71-73, 102-104, 207-209,
249-251, 305-307; Probate Record 76-78. No copies of that document could have been relied upon by Mrs. Sandberg in a claim
against Klein.
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situation.

In Lewis, the Washington Supreme Court consid-

ered letters of the respective parties to determine if a
sufficient memorandum existed to charge the seller.

Of

course, the seller's signature appeared only on his offering
letter which the court found contained an insufficient description of the alleged contract's subject matter.

Although

the buyer's letter of acceptance contained the requisite
additional descriptive terms, the Lewis Court correctly held
that the obviously responsive acceptance could not cure the
defect in the seller's offer.
Respondent cites a number of cases upon this
question, all of which have been carefully
read and considered, but none of them would
sustain a holding that the appellant could be
charged upon a memorandum which it did not
sign, and which designated the quantity,
where the writing signed by the appellant
did not sufficiently designate the subjectmatter in that respect.
They are cases where
the party sought to be charged signed a
memorandum which contained all the essential
terms of the car.tract, and which was simply
accepted by the opposite party, or cases
where the party sought to be charged had
accepted the terms as they were written
by the opposite party.
They are therefore
not applicable to the facts in the case
now before us.
(191 P. at 804).
Though the acceptance in Lewis was obviously related -co the
deficient offer and received without protest by the offeror,
it was not competent evidence against him and could not
supply the subject matter description, for it did not bear
his signature.

Even if the offeror had orally agreed, sue··

sequent to the writings, that the subject matter description
in the acceptance was correct, the evidence of that agreement
would not have been competent against him.

Though the parol
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evidence rule would facially allow such evidence of such
a subsequent parol agreement, the statute of frauds prohibits it because it would alter the signed writing.
enlargement or addition

Thus, any

of terms by a source external to

the writings bearing the signature of the party to be
charged violates the Statute of Frauds.
While appellants do not feel that the lower court's
consideration of a plethora of evidence clarifed the terms of
the written memoranda, the refusal to limit evidence in accordance with the Statute of Frauds was clearly improper and
allowed a mass of paper unilaterally supplied by respondent
to be considered as binding Mrs. Sandberg.

When this Court

considers the evidence, properly charging Mrs. Sandberg with
only those writings bearing her signature, it will be apparent that she has no contractual· liability to Klein.

None-

theless, while the parol evidence proffered by Klein in
purporting to add to the writ·ings is incompentent and inadmissable, it

does not clarify the writings, but merely

highlights their ambiguity.
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,,iii

PART TWO - THE OPTION AGREEMENT IS NOT
A DOCUMENT SUSCEPTIBLE OF

SPfefFTcfNroF:CE:ME:Nl'-POINT V

THE OPTION AGREEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1964
IS AN AGREEHENT TO AGREE;
AS SUCH IT MAY NOT BE JUDICIALLY ENFORCED
In 1970 the Utah Supreme Court in Jensen v. Anderson, 24 Utah 2d 191, 468 P.2d 366 (1970), stated the fundamental and uniform rule that option agreements are to be
strictly construed against the party drawing such agreements
where uncertainty and ambiguity appears.

The option agree-

ment upon which respondent Klein seeks specific performance
was admittedly drawn and prepared by him.

R. 69)

(AnRK No. 14,

Thus, where ambiguity or uncertainty exists in the

Option Agreement, it must be construed in favor of Wanda
Sandberg and against the respondent who relies on that document for specific performance.
a.

Contracts Expressly Leaving Material Terms To Future
Mutual Agreement Are Unenforceable.
A defect common to all types of contracts is the

deletion of essential terms.

Often, courts can supply the

terms by implication when the deficiency is the result of
inadvertence and the term is one of standard use.

However,

where it is apparent that the parties have failed to complete
their contract by expressly leaving essential terms to their
future mutual agreement, courts will not enforce the writing
that represents their preliminary agreement to agree at a
later date.
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Option agreements are frequently objectionable
on the ground that they constitute agreements to agree.

Of

course, by their nature, option agreements contemplate a
future contract (upon the optionee's exercise of the option),
but often the parties leave terms to their future agreement, instead of placing all the material terms in the opticn.

An

option must contain all the material terms to be susceptible
of a binding acceptance.

An acceptance adding terms is a

counteroffer, so also, an option leaving terms to be spell2d out
m~tual

by the acceptance or by future

agreement is not suscep-

tible of unilateral acceptance.
Courts will not enforce agreements to agree because
they cannot compel a nonconsenting party to agree to new and
unilaterally proposed terms.

In effect, such an indulgence

would be to judicially impose a state of mind on the objecting party, compelling that party to agree.

Courts uniformly

admit that even equity does not possess these ubiquitous powers,
nor will the courts intervene to

~ake,

alter or substantially

add to contracts as actually written and entered into by the
parties.
1

For example, in Lucey v. Hero International Corp-

oration, 281 N.E.2d 266 (Mass. 1962), the Massachusetts
Supreme Court considered a contract to purchase land which
granted plaintiff "an option to purchase additional land belonging to ... [the defendant], which said land shall be
northerly of the conveyed premises and along Lennox Road
as mutually .-,greed upon by both parties." 281 N. E. 2d at 268.
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In reversing the lower court's decree of specific performance in favor of the plaintiff-optionee, the Massachusetts
Court stated that the holding below that the optionee could
unilaterally select the property he desired would "ignore
the very words of the provision."

281 N.E.2d at 270.

Had

the option provided for a unilateral selection of land,
there would have been no question of its validity.

Courts

may compel a party to act and make a selection, but cannot
compel two parties to agree.
2d

Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah

338, 517 P. 2d 1026 (1973); Calder v. Third Judicial

District Court, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168 (1954).

The

words of the Massachusetts court in denying specific enforcement are precise and definitive:
We are also of the opinion that the option
agreement is too indefinite to be specifically
enforced. For that additional reason, the
final decree is wrong.
'An option to purchase
real estate is a unilateral contract by which
the owner of the property agrees with the holder of the option that he has the right to buy
the property according to the terms and conditions of the contract.' (citations omitted)
Since, therefore, an option is a contract,
'[a)ll the essential terms ... must be definite
and certain so that the intention of the parties may be discovered, the nature and extent
of their obligations ascertained and their
rights determined.' (citations omitted)
'The
court cannot make for the parties a contract
which they did not make for themselves.'
(citations omitted)
(Id. at 269)
In

Applebaug~1

v. Hohl, 535 P.2d 222 (Colo. Ct.

App. 1975), the Colorado Court of Appeals considered an
earnest money receipt to purchase three lots of a subdivision.

Specifically set forth in the earnest money

receipt was the total sales price of $11,000.00, with
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acknowledgment of a down payment of $1,000.00 by the plaintiff-purchaser.

In his complaint the plaintiff offered

to pay the $10,000.00 balance remaining on the purchase
price.

The Colorado Court, however, agreed with the defen-

dant's contentions that the memorandum of sale was unilateral
and not mutually binding or enforceable despite the fact
that it contained "many of the terms that would be included
in an option." 535 P.2d at 224.

The problematic clause in

the memorandum was the phrase "pending a mutually acceptable
contract to be furnished by buyer."

Id. at 223.

In holding

the memorandum of sale unenforceable the Court agreed that
it constituted merely an invitation to negotiate further and
that "[t]o have an enforceable contract or option, it must
appear that further negotiations are not required to work
out important and essential terms."

Id. at 224.

Similar to Lucey and Applebaugh is the California
case of Roberts v. Adams, 330 P.2d 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
In Roberts, the California Court of Appeals considered
a suit for specific performance on a term in a lease providing an option to purchase certain real property for a sum
of $85,000.00 "payable as mutually agreed by both parties."
The California appellate court stated that it is "Hornbook
law that an agreement to make an agreement is nugatory, and
that this is true of material terms of any contract."
330 P.2d at 901.

The policy for the Roberts holding was

then further clarified:
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Since either party by the terms of the promise
may refuse to agree to anything to which the
other party will agree, it is impossible for
the law to affix any obligation to such a
promise.
(Id. at 902, citing 1 Williston on
Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1936) §45 at lJT)_____
Several Utah decisions expressly recognize these
propositions.

For example, it is accepted in Utah that in

order to be binding and enforceable a contract must set
forth with sufficient definiteness all of its terms so that
each party knows what is required of him.

Kier v. Condrack,

25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327 (1970); Efco Distributing
Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615 (1966);
Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco Polo, 17 Utah 2d 181, 407 P.2d
565 (1965); Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597
(1962); Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d
427 (1961); Hansen v. Snell, 11 Utah 2d 64, 354 P.2d 1070
(1960); and Pelton's Spudnuts v. Doan, 120 Utah 366,
234 P.2d 852 (1951).
been held that

As a corollary to the above, it has

specific performance of an option agreement

cannot be decreed unless all of its terms are clear, since
the courts cannot compel performance of a contract upon
which the parties did not mutually agree.

Pitcher v. Laur-

itzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967).
Thus, when material terms of a contract are left
to the future agreement of the parties, such contracts are
nugatory as agreements to agree.

In cases where the material

provision to be agreed upon is the selection of lands covered
by the writing, it has been further held that such a designa-
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tion in the contract not only violates the prohibition against
enforcement of agreements to agree but also does not provide
a description sufficient and tenable under the Statute of
Frauds.

Thus, where parties leave the selection of the

tract to be conveyed under the written memorandum to future
mutual agreement, the memorandum is deficient under the
Statute of Frauds in that the description of land itself
cannot be accurately platted from the memorandum, because
the memorandum's very teTillS require another agreement. See
Calder v. Third Judicial District, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d
168 at 170 (1954), citing Scanlan v. Oliver, 42 Minn. 538,
34 N.W. 1031 (1890), which distinguished cases where the
contract of sale gave one of the parties thereto a right
of selection from those cases in which the particular piece
of property to be conveyed was. to be mutually agreed upon
between the parties, findir.g the former valid, the latter
unenforceable.

See also Annot., Sufficiency, Under the

Statute of Frauds, of Description or Designation of Land
in Contract or Memorandum of Sale Which Gives RiRht to
Select the Tract to be Conveyed, 46 A.L.R. 2d 894 (1956).
As a rule, therefore, a provision requiring future
agreement of the parties on any material term of a contract
renders that contract unenforceable.

The requirements of

the Statute of Frauds further prohibits such enforcement when
d

the material term to be agreed upon is the particular piece
' of real property to be conveyed by the writing.

Davison v.

Robbins, 30 Utah 338, 517 P.2d 1026(1973).
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The Davison case constitutes a definitive statement of Utah law on agreements to agree and the dual faceted
objection to such agreements when they pertain to the selection of real property, i.e., that such agreements violate
both the prescyiption against enforcement of agreements
to agree and the Statute of Frauds.

In Davison, plaintiffs,

approached defendants with an offer to purchase a parcel
of property for $90.00 per acre.

The parties executed a

purchase contract which provided that defendant-sellers were
to order a survey to determine the net acreage to be
conveyed after sellers' deduction of a reserved area designated as the "bottom land".

After sellers' reservation of

"bottom land" the final sale was made contingent on plaintiff-buyers' approval of the net acreage description.
The plaintiff-buyers attempted to define the
term "bottom land" through parol, testifying that defendant-sellers had pointed the certain fence lines, posts,
and a highway to delineate the property to be retained.
Though defendant-sellers vigorously denied this testimony
the findings of the trial court reflected a belief in
the plaintiff-buyers' parol version of the transaction.
Immediately prior to trial, defendant-sellers indicated
that they had elected to reserve from the sale all of
their property (presumably as "bottom land") except for
one acre.

Nonetheless, the trial court found the contract

valid and enforceable and that plaintiff-buyers were entitled to specific performance.
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Defendants claimed on appeal that the trial court
had:
1. Erred in admitting parol evidence indicating
defendants' intention to reserve certain land
within existing land marks, and
2. That the contract constituted merely an
agreement to agree in the future leaving the
matter of the reservation of acreage and that
acreage conveyed open to future mutual agreement.
Relying on Calder v. Third Judicial District Court,
supra, this Court distinguished a fact situation wherein one
party was specifically granted the exclusive right to select
the property and the contract in Davison wherein the piece
of property to be conveyed was to be mutually agreed upon
by the parties.

After distinguishing the two fact situations,

the Utah Supreme Court, ruling on both the agreement to agree
objection and the parol evidence objection, held as follows:
In the instant action, the agreement in
clear and unambiguous terms provided that the
location and description of the land to be conveyed was subject to the future mutual agreement of the parties·. This writing constituted
a mere expression of a purpose to make a contract
in the future for the whole matter was contingent
on further negotiation. The trial court erred
in its conclusion that the writing constituted
a valid, enforceable contract.
Defendants further contend that the agreement does not describe the property to be
reserved with sufficient certainty to support
a decree of specific performance, and the
trial court erred in admitting parol evidence
to cure this defective description.
Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not
to supply, a description of lands in the contract. Parol evidence will not be admitted
to complete a defective description, or to
show the intention with which it was made.
Parol evidence may be used for the purpose of
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identifying the description contained in the
writing with its location upon the ground,
but not for the purpose of ascertaining and
locating the land about which the parties
negotiated, and supplying the description
thereof which they have omitted from t~e
writing. There is a clear distinction between the admission of oral and extrinsic
evidence for the purpose of identifying the
land described and applyin~ the description
to the property and that of supplying and
adding to a description insufficient and void
on its face.
(30 Utah 2d at 341 (footnote
omitted))
Again Davison evinced a two-pronged attack on the
enforceability of the contract that was before the Court:
1. The contract by its own terms contemplated
further negotiations and was void and uneforceable.
2. As the contemplated future negotiation
dealt with the selection of land, the land
description was insufficient under the Statute
of Frauds and could not be remedied by
the admission of parol evidence.
There is authority which seems to suggest that even
leaving future agreement as an alternative to specified terms
may result in a contract being found unenforceable.

For example.I

I

in Kline v. Rogerson, 181 P.2d 385 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947),
the California district court of appeals held that a plaintiff

'

seller could not enforce an agreement of purchase and sale agaim!
aefendant since it provided that the balance of the purchase
price was to be paid "at $5,000 or more per year, plus interest at 5/'. or terms to mutual satisfaction."

181 P.2d 387.

The defendant-buyer refused to pay $5,000.00 per year
and sought a renegotiation at $2,000.00 per year.

The

Court denied a decree of specific performance stating that
the parties never agreed upon terms which were mutually
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satisfactory.

Though it would seem that the defendant should

have been held to his agreement to pay $5,000.00 per year,
the court apparently felt that the alternative provision for
mutu~l

agreement, in light of his refusal to perform according

to the specific provision rendered the contract unenforceable.
Kline is authority for the proposition that providing for a
future agreement only as an alternative renders a contract
void.
b.

The Option Agreement was an Agreement to Agree.
In light of the foregoing analysis, appellants urge

that the trial court's finding that the Option Agreement
dated September 21, 1964, did not constitute an agreement
to agree is not only untenable but utterly capricious.

The

entire history of the transaction is replete with ·such agreements.

It is telling that page 2 of the original Earnest

Money Receipt gave the buyer 30 days from date hereof to
enter into an option "on the terms as above set out and on
such other terms as the parties hereto may agree."

When

the Earnest Money Receipt was ultimately superseded by the
1°1

Option Agreement which is the subject matter of this case,
both the appellant Wanda Sanderg and the respondent stated
the Option Agreement set forth "the terms and conditions of
said option to purchase, as heretofore granted, together
with the modification to which the parties have agreed."
One of the conditions to which the parties agreed was the
mode of exercising the Option Agreement and more specifically
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the manner of the selection of land to be included in the
respondent's ultimate purchase.

That mode of selection

is a singular statement clearly embodying both a necessity
and an invitation for future negotiations.

Quoting from

paragraph 5 of the Option Agreement:
5. The Buyer may exercise his right to purchase his property for the sum of Two Hundred
Dollars ($200.00) per acre at any time during
the option period, (including any extension
period) by executing a contract to purchase
all or such part or parts of the property as
~arties may agree; such contract to purchase shall provide as follows .
. (R. 61
(emphasis added))
The above excerpted paragraph specifies the only
means of exercising the Option Agreement upon which
seeks specific performance.

respond~nt

Clearly, the structure of the

paragraph in question allows no other interpretation
than that the future agreement of the parties was required
as to the amount of the land to be subject to the exercise
of the option.

In order to allow the greatest flexibility

to themselves, the parties noted that the eventual agreement could cover the whole or one part or many parts of the
land.

The prepositional phrase "as the parties may agree"

must be construed as modifying the

iJTu~ediately

preceding

word "property' , which is in turn modified by the phrase
"all or such part or parts"

This is required by the doc-

trine of "last antecedent" which requires that a qualifier
refer to the immediately preceding phrase or word.
Bryan, 77 Utah 604, 299 P.253 (1931).

Dunn v.

It is telling that

each of the words "all", "part", and "parts", is clarified
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by the phrase "of the property" which phrase completes the
thought for each alternative exercise contemplated by the
parties.
That the entire phrase "all or such part or parts
of the property" is modified by the qualifier requiring
agreement can also be shown by an examination of the entire
sentence.

Schematically diagrannned the sentence appears as

follows:
Buyer--may exercise--right- by executing
~aZZ-::-:-._

contract to purchase...__ such par;_--of the property as
---..parts
the parties may agree.

This disjunction "or" which joins the three words "all",
"part", and "parts", indicates that each is an alternative
within the contemplation of the·parties.
It is clear that substantial modification of the
contract would be required to. allow interpretation of paragraph 5 of the Option Agreement as requiring future mutual
agreement only if the optionee exercised as to a part or
parts of the greater parcel.

Again, the clause in question

which is before this court appears as follows in the Option
Agreement:
... by executing a contract to purchase all or
such part or parts of the property as the
parties may agree . . . (R. 61)
First, a clear disjuntion must be made between "all" and
"such part or parts".
a connna,

This could be done by insertion of

~·
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contract to purchase all, or such pa~t or
parts of the property as the parties may
agree.
Second, the preposition object "all" must be completed independently of "such part or parts" by the preposition "of the
property",

~·

contract to purchase all of the property, or
such part or parts of the property as the
parties may agree.
Finally, the qualifying phrase "as the parties may agree" must
be made clearly inapplicable to the purchase of "all of the
property" by making the clauses before and after the disjunction independent of each other by supplying each other with
a

verb,~·

contract to purchase all of the property, or
to purchase such part or parts of the property
as the parties may agree.
Such judicial rewriting of the Option Agreement,
however, is clearly impermissible, as modification may not
be made in the guise of interpretation.

East Mill Creek

Water Company v. Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863
(1945). Further, words, punctuation, and phrases may not
be supplied where lacking, and adding, ignoring or discarding
words in the process of interpretation is improper.

Cornwall

v. Willow Creek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 369 P. 2d 928
(1962).

Alteration of meaning simply may not be made where

the meaning is clear, and where it is apparent that the parties and the draftsmen could have expressed the:nselves differently had they so desired.

Simply stated the p&rties

must be held to their clear and understandable lan3uar,e as
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conunitted to writing.

Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah

2d 276, 323 P.2d 359 (1958).

That the parties chose to rely

on their future mutual agreement as to the selection of land
upon the exercise of the option does not justify a wholesale
rewriting of the paragraph simply because the provision
itself was an improvident one.

Skousen v. Smith, 27 Utah 2d

169, 493 P.2d 1003 (1972); Ephraim Theater v. Hawk, 7 Utah
2d 163, 321 P.2d 221 (1958).

Utah courts when confronted

with such a contract have neither attempted to redraft its
terms nor to cure it through parol evidence.

In fact the

Utah courts have uniformly declared such contracts unenforceable.

Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026

(1973).
That the language requiring future mutual agreement in all events in the selection of land was purposefully chosen is evident by examination of the rest of the
contract.

In two other paragraphs, future mutual agreement

was specified as an alternative, and the alternative
nature of the method is clear.

For example, paragraph 5(e)

provides for release of land upon selection by the Buyer
of contiguous parcels, or upon agreement of the parties
if non-contiguous parcels are sought.
Land to be released shall be selected by the
Buyer provided such land is contiguously
6elected or otherwise mutually agreed by
the parties.
The method of mutual future agreement is clearly alternative
to the choice by Buyer of contiguous land.
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.

Another provision for future mutual agreement as
an alternative is found in paragraph 5(b):
The Buyer shall pay a down payment of Two
Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) (or such other
amount as the parties may agree) on said contract ... (R. 61)
Again, this drafting is clear in providing that the require.
5
ment o f f uture mutua 1 agreement was a 1 ternative.
If the parties had intended under paragraph 5 of
the Option Agreement to require future mutual agreement as
to the selection of land in only those instances where the
optionee desired a part or parts of the Sandberg land, then
the respondent and his attorney clearly had the capacity
and opportunity to draft the Option Agreement to so indicate.
The condition of future mutual agreement was not stated as
an alternative, however, but as a requirement in all
instances.

Many logical explanations exist for the making

of such a requirement, the most probable being the uncertainty in the minds of the

optionor and optionee in 1964 as to

the amount of land each wished to conm<it to the terms of
the option.

The liberal use by the parties of the method

of future mutual agreement has already been shown.

Under

apparently amicable circumstances the method did not seem
at all uncertain, but it is well accepted that equity will
not compel parties to agree.

5
rt should be noted that each of these provisions
under the rule in Kline v. Rogerson, 181 P.2d 385 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1947) may render the contract unenforceable.
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That the Option Agreement contemplated further
negotiations pertaining to the land to be included in the
contract contemplated in the option's exercise is further
evinced by the letter of respondent Klein dated March 30,
1971 to Wanda Sandberg.

Paragraph 4 of the letter of

March 30, 1971, reads as follows:
My interpretation of the number of acres involved essentially corresponds with yours,
namely that the land Wayne intended to sell
lies west of the fence line that you and I
have both seen together. I would like you
to know that I can apureciate your concern
that this line be agreed to by both of us.
As I read the original and supplemental agreenent, I have had some questions of interpretation in ny mm mind, but must conclude in
good conscience, if you have in fact been
conducting your feeding operation all these
years where you presently are now doing so,
that that property east of the fence clearly
was to be excluded. I walked the fence line
the other day and noted that i~ had some
irregular jogs in it t~at you and I should
probably discuss in order to assure absolute
clarification. I see no problem in this
connection as I am as a matter of personal
principle disE_?sed to afree with your wishes.
(R. 71 (emphasis added)
As can readily be seen, respondent Klein both knew and understood that the boundary lines of any parcel to be selected
were to be agreed to by both parties and that further clarification was necessary to define the lands to be included
in the contract.

Magnanimously, he indicated that as a

IDatter of personal principle he would be inclined to agree
with her wishes, however, he now seeks specific enforcement of a contract pertaining to real property that Mrs.
Sandberg does not agree to sell.
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Paragraph 5 of the letter then states as follows:
If you think ab?ut it, descriptions along section
or quarter section lines generally arc more easily
handled.
It is for this reason, after careful
review that I have discribed [sic] the annexation
description as indicated by the plat which I am
including with this letter.
This description,
within a few feet, corresponds with the fence
line that you and I have observed together when
we last saw each other.
This I trust will cor~ond with your own interpretation of what
~r~an:_c_,d-~y~o_u_iri fact oeiieve you are selling.
Should you still have some apprehensio~_!li_at I
am not aware of, I am sure that on a face to
basis and with the help of a surveyor we
can resolve fairly to each of our satisfaction
WFiatever diffenences [sic] of opinion we m_ay
encounter.
I am enclosing a dra·;;ring showing
my proposed annexation request; not the indication of the fence line which I have included.
(R. 71 (emphasis added))

race

Analyzing the fifth paragraph of the March 30, 1971, letter,
the Court should be aware that neither the Earnest Money
Receipt nor the Option Agreement ever described land in
terms of quarter sections.

Further, whereas paragraph 4

of the letter states that some property east of a fence
was to be excluded from the contract, paragraph 5 indicates
that the description provided with the letter only "within
a few feet, corresponds with the fence line .

II

There-

after Klein expresses his belief that this description will
correspond with what in fact Mrs. Sandberg believed she was
selling, and that any differences of opinion be resolved

by agreement with the help of a surveyor.

It is impossible

to conclude that the Option Agreement did not contemplate
a future agreement regarding the description of land in the
ultimate contract.

It is impossible to conclude in light of
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the "exercising" letter that the Option Agreement was not
an agreement to agree, as the "exercising" letter itself
indicates

the necessity of future agreement and amicable

cooper'ation.

Indeed, on page 2 of his letter to Wanda

Sandberg (R. 72), respondent Klein states that in April
and May of 1971 they should "try to ... [p) rep are a land
purchase agreement consistent with the terms of an option
agreement and the accepted number of acres involved .

"

Preparation of a land purchase agreement prior to June of 1971
was crucial because in June of 1971 the Option Agreement expired
by its own terms.
This lawsuit, as in Davison presents hard evidence
that a final agreement was never made.

Parol cannot be used

to supply the terms of such an agreement, and Klein's contract of June of 1972 cannot be enforced against Mrs. Sandberg who has not signed the same.

The Option Agreement

clearly provided that in its exercise the selection of
land was to be made by mutual agreement in the future.
Davison stands for the clear proposition that such a document cannot be judicially enforced simply because the law
cannot compel someone to attain a state of mind, that is,
to agree.

Further, similar to Davison, it is improper to

allow the introduction of incompetent parol evidence to
add to an otherwise facially insufficient description or
to attest to what the optionor at one time may have agreed.
Davison,

~;

Reed v. Lowe, 8 Utah 39, 29 P. 740 (1892);

Adams v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465 (1915); Campbell v.
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Nelson, 102 Utah 78, 125 P.2d 413 (1942); and Holmgren Brothers
Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975).

Thus, the Option

Agreement's manner of exercise as set forth in paragraph 5
clearly constitutes an agreement to agree, and, as such,
must be held unenforceable.

Further, whatever description

was provided Mrs. Sandberg with the March 30th letter by
its own terms and by respondent's own admissions varied
from prior proposals.

Nonetheless, not one of respondent

Klein's proposals can be aided by parol evidence as the
land description was to be mutually agreed on.
testimony is clearly inadmissible.

Such parol

Davison, supra.

Respondent Klein may claim that the conveyance
of 40 acres by Wanda Sandberg constituted some acquiescence
or be akin to some form of part performance under the contract
he proposed for her signature.
fail on three points:

This argument, however, would

(1) the "exercising" letter of March

30, 1971, requested that 55 acres be released not 40;

(2)

the contract upon which the respondent seeks specific performance was not drafted until May of 1972 and not presented to
appellant Sandberg until June of 1972, a year after the conveyance, and (3) the doctrine of part performance cannot be
relied on to overcome the proscription of the Statute
of Frauds because any acts relied on to overcome that proscription must be exclusively referrable to the oral c?ntract.
Holmgren Brothers Inc., ~·

Significantly, the letter of

March 30 does not refer to Wanda Sandberg's conveyance of 40
~cres of land, but rather to a release of 55 acres.
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Further,

it is iIT-possible to construe that conveyance as being exclusively referrable to a contract not drafted and indeed
not in existence until a year later.

The respondent simply

cannot change this chronology nor can this Court legitimately ignore it.

Thus, we urge the Court to reverse the

trial court's holding not simply to remand on these points:
(1) Neither in equity nor at law do courts recognize the
power to compel the appellant to agree.

The Option Agree-

ment by its express, concise, and clear terminology constitutes an agreement to agree.

(2) Since the land selection

clause contemplated future agreement, the land description
in the Option Agreement violates the Statute of Frauds.
(3)

There is no evidence of a clear, definite and mutually

understood parol contract established by clear, une·quivocal
and definite testimony, furthermore such parol is incompetent to aid the otherwise insufficient description.
Indeed, as the letter of March 30, 1971, indicates,
if Wanda Sandberg had agreed to all of its terms she would
simply have been saying "I will agree to get together with
you and agree."

To hold otherwise and sustain the trial

court's finding that the Option Agreement was not an agreement to agree is to ignore its clear language and the
obvious admissions in respondent's letter.
c

·.rhc: Option Agreement was not Complete.
It is essential that a contract, to be specific-

ally enforceable, contain all its terms and be complete.
Fqilure to annex a document ref erred to in the body of the
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contract may indicate a failure to reach a complete agreement.
In Kerr Glass Mfg. Corp. v .. Elizabeth Arden Sales

Co~,

141

P.2d 938 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943), failure to attach building
plans expressly called for by a lease rendered the lease for
the land site and proposed building unenforceable.

In this

case, the parties stated in the Option Agreement that the
property subject to the option was to be
... more particularly described in Schedule
A attached hereto, to be sjgned by the parties and made a part hereof for all purposes.
(R. 60).

An attachment with a legal

descr~ption

was to be made so that

the area of land subject to the option would be certain.

The

signatures of both parties were required to evince the
approval of the parties to the description.

The description

was to be an integral part of the agreement and at the time
of the agreement was thought to be of such import as to require
mutual approval, and subseqt'ent subscription.
The law provides, where an essential element of the
:ontract is specifically left for future negotiation, that
the contract is unenforceable.

Were the term one of standard

usage and merely deleted, the court might imply it.

But

where the provision is specifically reserved for the future
agreement of the parties, courts can neither imply the term
nor, can it be gainsaid, compel the agreement.
The Option Agreement was never completed, as is
evidenced by the nonexistence of a signed, mutually approved
attachment.
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To allow otherwise, that is, to allow the lower
court to engraft a suitable Exhibit "A" invites several
possibilities, among which are the description of land
annexed to the City of St. George and referred to in the
letter of respondent Klein in March of 1971 and the contract
description presented in May of 1972 to Mrs. Sandberg for
her signature as grantor.

The folly of this type of judicial

surgery is the omniscience it necessarily presumes, as Klein
has indicated he is exercising the option as to the land
described by both documents, yet neither description conforms
with the other.

(See POINT VI, infra.)

As Mr. Klein has

presented the court with two nonconforming descriptions and
was clearly unable between March of 1971 and

~ay

of 1972 to

make up his mind as to the lands he desired to submit for
agreement, it is incongruous that the Court should do it
for him, and then tell Mrs. Sandberg that the court's choice
was the one that she and her deceased husband would have
agreed to, annexed as Exhibit "A", and signed all along in 1964.
POINT VI
THE LAND DESCRIPTIONS ARE AMBIGUOUS AND CONTRADICTORY
Beyond the evidentiary burden of certain and definite proof to support a decree of specific performance, the
Statute of Frauds requires the land to be conveyed to be identified with certainty.
This requirement of certain identification is in
accordance with the evidentiary, cautionary, and protective
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policies underlying the Statute.

Thus, judicial cognizance

of contracts with insufficient land descriptions would both
contravene the legislative exaction of certainty and require

t~,

courts to divine the intent or mutual understanding of the
parties.
The test for determining sufficiency for a description of land looks to the specificity and certainty of the
description contained on the operative memorandum.

See

Annot., Sufficiency of Description of Land in Contract or
Memorandum of Sale, Under Statute of Frauds, 23 A.L.R. 2d
6 (1952).

A statement of the Utah requirments of specific-

ity of description was made in Jacobsen v. Cox, 115 Utah
102, 202 P.2d 714, 721

(1949).

A description is sufficient if when read in
the light of the circumstances of possession,
ownership, situation of the parties, and
their relation to each other and to the
property, as they were when the writing was
made, it identifies the propertv.
A
description is sufficient, although vague
in respect of the boundaries, if it identifies a specific tract of land when applied
to the facts on the surface of the earth,
as where a surveyor with the contract in
his hands and with the aid of no other means
than those provided, cculd go to the place
stated therein and accurately locate the
land.
49 Arn.Jur., "Statute of Frauds" §348.
An examination of the Earnest Money Receipt and
Option Agreement will reveal that the land descriptions thereon are ambiguous.

Neither of the descriptions are capable

of location by a surveyor.

The anbiguities in these

descriptions, further, are not cured by parol evidence in
the form of Klein's letter of March 30, 1971, and the
real estate purchase contract of June, 1972.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-54-

Respondent Klein has alleged in his counterclaim
that the descriptions on the Earnest Money Receipt and
Option Agreement are identical to the description on the
real estate purchase con tract.

(CRK H 1 and 3, R. 166)

The court below also found these descriptions to be in
substantial conformity.

(Order,

neither the lower court nor
land descriptions.

~he

~4,

R. 358)

Apparently,

respondent has read the

Not only is conformity doubtful, but

contradiction is obvious.
Each of the written descriptions describes the
land as a large parcel, excepting a certain portion to be
reserved by the sellers.

The Earnest Money Receipt, sub-

scribed to by Mrs. Sandberg, describes the land as follows:
All land owned by the sellers in Sections 21,
22, and 27 Township 42 South, Range 15 West,
S.L.M., consisting, so far as the parties can
determine at this time of approximately 500
acres not including, any water or water rights,
and less the following:
There is now a reservoir constructed by the
City of St. George on what the parties believe
to be the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22, and
there is an old fence running north and south
west of this reservoir. The sellers intend
to reserve from said sale all land in said
Section 22 which lies east of said fence line,
it being understood that the exact line will
have to be determined if and when the option
hereinafter mentioned is executed. (R. 196)
The Option Agreement, also signed by Mrs. Sandberg, described
the land in a similar fashion--as a whole, but with one
significant change in the excepted portion of the land
designated by reference to a fence and reservoir:
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Land owned by the Sellers in Section 21, Section 22, and Section 27 of Township 42 South,
Range 15 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
consisting of approximately 500 acres, which
property shall be more particularly described
in Schedule A attached hereto, to be signed
by the parties and made a part hereof for
all purposes; not including any water or
water rights, and excluding all land in the
Northeast one quarter of the Northeast one
quarter of Section 22, which lies East of the
old fence line, which runs North and Southwest
of the City of St. George reservoir, said excluded property also to be more particularly
described in Schedule A attached hereto and
made a part hereof for all purposes.
(R. 59)
In the first description the reservoir is in the NE
1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22, and the excepted area is somewhere
in Section 22.

In the latter description, it is not the

reservoir which is in the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22, but
the excepted part is now confined to that area.

In the

Earnest Money Receipt's description the excepted part was in
Section 22--a possible exception of 640 acres, while in the
Option Agreement, the possibly excepted area is reduced to
the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of that section, which comprises approximately 40 acres.
The letter of March 30, 1971, which is admissible
as parol evidence only to show an alleged exercise of the
Option Agreement or to clarify ambiguities in that agreement,
nonetheless, does not aid the prior descriptions, but confuses further.
The letter referred to the land only in general ter~

i
\

and did not contain in its text any specific description.

Re- '

spondent Klein did state, however, that he was only annexing
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"that land which I am in fact buying from you."

(R. 73)

The annexation plat described the land without exception or
reservation and in fact contained,
All of the NE 1/4 Section 22, Less that uortion
within Washington City.
All of the NW 1/4 Section 22 lying south of Interstate Highway 15.
All of the NW 1/4 SW 1/4 & E 1/2 SW 1/4 Section 22.
All of the E 1/2 NE 1/4 Section 21 lying south of
Interstate Highway 15.
NE 1/4 SE 1/4 Section 21.
All of Sectional lots 1 & 2 Section 22.
All being located in T.42S., R.15W., Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.
(R. 109(emphasis added))
The description in the real estate contract submitted
by Klein, held by the lower court to be in conformity with
the description in the Option Agreement (Order

~4,

R. 358),

would most certainly conform to the annexation plat as Klein
in his purported letter of exercise stated that he was annexing
"only that land which I [he] am [was] in fact buying from
you [Sandberg]."

(R. 73)

Nonetheless, the description

on the contract in attempting to describe a fence and reserve
the area east of the fence to the prospective seller,
reserves land to Mrs. Sandberg in both the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of
Section 22 AND in the SE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22:
The following described property located in Washington County, State of Utah, Township 42 South,
Range 15 West:

-57-
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Section 22:
The
the
the
the
the

Southeast
Northeast
Northwest
Southeast
Northeast

Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter

of
of
of
of
of

the
the
the
the
the

Southwest
Southwest
Southwest
Northwest
Northwest

Quarter;
Quarter;
Quarter;
Quarter;
Quarter.

Also,
Beginning in an existing fence line at its intersection with the north line of Section 22, T42S,
Rl5W, SLB&M which point is 12.2 feet west from a
stone mound marking the NE corner NW 1/4 NE 1/4
said Section 22 and running thence S 0°14' W
1338.5 feet along said fence line, thence S
89°36' 30" E 443.0 feet along said fence, thence
S 10°09'30" W 405.0 feet along said fence, thence
S 83°49'30" W 107.0 feet along said fence, thence
S 12°40'10" W 910.49 feet, more or less, along
said fence to the South line NE 1/4 said Section
22, thence west 1380 feet to the SW corner said
NE 1/4, thence north 2640 feet to the N 1/4 corner said Section 22, thence east 1307.8 feet to
the point of beginning. Containing 86.84 acres,
more or less.
Section 21:
The Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter;
the Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter.
Section 27:

All of sectional lot 1 consisting of approximately 19 acres; all of sectional lot 2 consisting of
approximately 47 acres.

All of said property consisting of approximately
431. 34 acres.

(R. 328)

The description of Section 22 on the real estate pur·
chase contract which purports to describe the fence as it
stands appears graphically as follows.

(See also R. 321)
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Real Estate Purchase

reserved
to Mrs.
Sandberg

Section 22

The description pertaining to Section 22 on the
annexation plat enclosed with t'.1e letter of March 30, 1971,
which Klein stated represented within "a few feet" the land
which he was "buying" from Mrs. Sandberg appears graphically
as fol lmrn :

Annexation Plat

City of Washington

(Entirety of Section
22 annexed to City
of St. George, except
portion in City of
Washfngton.)

Section 22

:Sxcept for a "few feet", there was apparently no re3ervation
of land for Mrs. Sandberg.

The difference between the de-

scription

plat and the description on

~n

the

a~nexation

the contract, however, is more than the "few feet" indicated
by th= letter.

The distance between the fence line on the

real estate contract and the east section line of Section 22
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is approximately 1/4 mile.

As a result,

the ultimate area

covered by the proferred contract is at least 70 acres less
than that land annexed to the City of St. George which
Klein stated he intended to buy on March 30, 1971.
Option Agreeffient

It is not possible
to graphically represent the
fence and area reserved as
described by the original
Option Agreement, but the

NEl/4 Sec. 22

area possibly excepted was
specifically limited to the
NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22
which is approximately 40
acres.

Section 22

The reservoir pre-

sumably would lie to the south anc1 northeast of a fence
located in th2t area.
The description of the fence on the Earnest Money
Earnest Money Receipt

Receipt likewise cannot be
graphically represented.

The

reservoir therein is specifically located, however, in the
NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22
and the area subject to possible reservation is described
as the entirety of Section 22,
totalling approximately 640
acres.
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Beyond the aforementioned ambiguity and uncertainty
in the Earnest

~1oney

Receipt, Option Agreement and letter

with accompanying plat, there is a clear contradiction
betwe.e~

the description on the Option Agreement and the de-

scription on the real estate purchase contract presented by
Klein for Mrs. Sandberg's signature in 1972.

The Option Agree-

ment specifically excludes some lands from its purview,
but limits those lands to an area within the NE 1/4
NE 1/4 of Section 22 unless the parties mutually agree to an
exercise as to
ment.

part of the land subject to the Option Agree-

The contract, however, reserves land in both the NE

1/4 NE 1/4 and in the SE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22 to the
appellants and clearly, requests an exercise as to only a
portion of land subject to the Option Agreement.
Option Agreement
~---------

Section 22

Section 22

Obviously, Klein has selected only a part of land
cove~ed

by the Option Agreement, which, like any selection

requires the mutual agreement of the parties.

To grant
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specific performance to the respondent on these facts and to
blithely find the descriptions in conformity flies in the
face of the facts, demeans the requirement of descriptive
conformity of the documents, and allows Klein to unilaterally
select lands for purchase oblivious to the contractual limitations of the Option Agreement.
Thus the several land descriptions on the Earnest
Mondy Agreement, the Option Agreement, the Annexation Plat
and the real estate purchase contract are at variance with
each other and actually contradictory.

To sustain the lower

court's holding that they are in conformity would require
this Court to close its eyes to the several descriptions in
the record.

Appellant invites this Court's scrutiny of those

descriptions both as written and as platted in the record,

a~d

strenuously urges the Court to find that the contract presented
for specific performance in excepting lands from the SE 1/4
NE 1/4 of Section 22 is not in conformity to the plain
language of the Option Agreement unless the exercise was as
to only a smaller tract, and clearly excludes lands annexed
to St. George that on March 30, 1971, Klein indicated he was
purchasing in his letter of "exercise".
Finally, it

s~ould

be noted that there is no evi-

dence that the fence line surveyed at Klein's instance is the
fence mentioned in the Earnest Money Receipt and Option
Agreement.

Klein, in his letter of March 30, 1971, stated
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that he had some questions of interpretation, as to what
Wayne Sandberg, then deceased, wanted to do, and that he
appreciated Mrs. Sandberg's concern that the fence be
agreed to by both parties.

It never was.

Ascertainment of Way.1e··Sa.1dberg' s intent will be
impossible at this date.

He is deceased and Klein, the other

party to negotiations regarding the location of the fence
line, is incompetent to testify as to those transactions.
Utah Code Ann. 78-2tf-2(3).
Further, there is no evidence of an agreement between Klein and Mrs. Sandberg as to where the fence line is
located.

In fact,

the surveyor testified that the fence line

as surveyed was indicated to him by Klein alone.
Not only is it evident that no clear and certain
agreement was reached on the land area to be conveyed, it is
also facially apparent that Klein himself has not been consistent in requesting one p_iece of land over another.

Thus,

there is not only no sufficient certainty in the several
descriptions to allow a decree of specific performance, but
the several descriptions themselves are both ambiguous and,
in futile attempts at certainty, clearly contradictory.
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PART THREE - THE OPTION

\~AS

NOT PROPERLY EXERCISED

POINT VII
AS RESPONDENT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE OPTION
NO CONTRACT HAS ARISEN

a.

Re~pond_ent

Klein Has the Bt:rden_Q_f__Sho~vin__g_J)_t_ri~_Compli
ance with the Terms-of the Option as Cor.s truec Ago.inst Him.
Under Utah law an optionee seeking specific perform-

ance bears the burden of showing that he has strictly complied '
with all the terffis of the option.
Co., v. Thom__p_~o~.

Lincoln Land

& Development

26 Utah 2d 324, 489 P.2d 426 (1971).

Strict compliance is required because an option creates a
standing offer on specified terms which may not be withdravm
and is wholly for the benefit of the buyer.
Property, §44Ld, p.258.

~rd

Thompson On Real

Lumber & Investment Co.,

·;r.

Construction Products Corp., 255 P.2d 473 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1953), states the rationale in these terms:
Since the optionor is bound while the optionee
is free to accept or notas he chooses, courts
are strict in holding an optionee to exact
compliance with the terms of the option.
(255 P.2d at 478)
The law does not place a duty upon the optionor to
help the option~e tender a prorer acceotance.
We find no rule of law to the effect chat the
optionee, by serving on optionor an inadequate
notice of election to exercise the option,
casts on the optionor any duty to instruct or
inform the optionee of the particulars in
which the election to exercise the option
fails to meet the terms and conditio~s thereof;
nor do we find that under such circumstances
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the optionor is required to take any affirmative
action on the theory that the optionee will
amend or correct an inadequate acceptance.
(Koplin v. Bennett, 155 So.2d 568, 573 (Fla.
App. 1963))
Further, where uncertainty or ambiguity appears
in an option contract, such uncertainty or ambiguity is to
be construed against the party drawing the instrunent.

Jen-

sen v. Anderson, 24 Utah 2d 191, 468 P.2d 366 (1970).

Under

oath, Klein has already admitted that the Option Agreement
was drawn and prepared by him.

(AnRK No. 14, R. 69)

There··

fore, Klein has the burden of showing strict compliance with
the terms of the option, as construed against him.
b.

The Purported Exercise o:' the Option Agreement Was
Improper As To For@.
An option like any other offer, may only.be accept-

ed on the terms set forth therein.

For example, in Nance v.

Schoonover, 521 P.2d 896 (Utah ·1974), the option under consi.deration required payment of $17,000.00 in cash as part
of the condition for its exercise.
the

This Court held that

tender of a personal check in the amount of $17,000.00

by the optionee did not comply with the terms of the option
and therefore the attempted exerci.se was fatally defective.
See also, Lincoln Land Development v. Thompson, 26 Utah 2d
324, 298 P.2d 426 (1971); Coombs v. Ouzunian, 24 Utah 2d
39, 77 P.2d 356 (1970); Chournos v. Evona Investment Co.,
~7

U~ah

35, 94 P.2d 470 (1939); Tilton v. Sterling Coal

Coke Co.,

&

28 Utah 173, 77 P. 758 (1904)
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Paragraph 5 of the Option Argreement specifically
required that the option be exercised by the preparation
and submission of a real estate contract.
5. The Buyer may exercise his right to purchase
this property for the sum of Two Hundred Dollars
($200.00) per acre at any time during the option
period, (including any extension period) by executing a contract to purchase all or such part or
parts of the property as the parties may agree;
such contract to purchase shall provide as follows . . . (R. 61)
Subparagraphs (a) through (h) which follow state the terms and
conditions that are to be included or agreed to in the contract
to purchase.

The terms and conditions, inter alia, include:

1. Payments made during the option period would
apply to the total purchase price (subparagraph
(a)) .

2. Provision for dovm payment of $2,000.00 or such
other sum as the parties might agree upon and the
further provision that the total payments made
during the first ye2r in which the option was
exercised was not to 29% of the total purchase
price (subparagraph b)).
3.
Contract period not to exceed ten years (subparagraph (c)).
4. Payment of the remaining balance in ten annual
installments and provision for 3% interest on the
balance (subparagraph (d)).
5. Contiguous partial releases or as otherwise
mutually agreed (subparagraph (e)).
6. Default provisions applicable to both the
option itself and the land purchase contract
(subparagraph (f)).
7. Provision for drilling for water (subparagraph
(g)) .
8. Provisions for abstract of t:Ltle (subparagraph
(h)).
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It should be noted that the down payment referred
to in subparagraph b is technically a term and condition of
the purchase contract, and that the contract, not the payment, would exercise the option.

Further, the total purchase

price is not stated due to the fact that it is to be determined by multiplying $200.00 by the number of acres agreed upon
by both parties ([contract for] "all or such part or parts

of the property as the parties may agree").
To exercise the option, Klein was required to
execute and submit a purchase contract prior to the expiration of the option.

The terms of ti1at

con~ract

are partially

set forth in the Option Agreement and partially to be agreed
upon.

Klein's failure to execute a real estate contract

on or before June 14, 1971, though tendering the down payment contemplated thereunder, was a fatally defective
attempt to exercise the option.

v. Kona Company,

For example, in Cillessen

73 N.M. 297, 387 P.2d 867 (1964), plain-

tiffs had tendered monies required as part payment on the
exercise of an option for real estate, which monies had
been accepted by the optionor.

Despite plaintiffs' claims

that such part performance rendered the option enforceable,
the New Mexico Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' specific
performance on the basis that they had failed to strictly
comply with the terms of the option which specifically
iequired them to notify the optionor of their exercise in
writing.
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Respondent Klein admits that no contract to purchase
land included in the option agreement was executed or submitted
by him prior to June 15, 19 71.

(AnRK Nos. 10 and 11, R. 68)

Clearly in June of 1971, the Option Agreement had not been
exercised.

The lower court's holding that the letter of March

30, 1971, and tender of $2,000.00 in June of that same year
constitutes the exercise of the option both is oblivious to
and ignores the clear requirements of the Option Agreement.
The court may have relied on the language in many cases stating
that! "notice of exercise" is all that is required.

However,

those cases all involve options which do not specify submission of a contract as the meaas of exercise. Where the option
merely requires notice to exercise,notice is sufficient, but
where the option calls for submission of a contract to effect
an exercise, that mode limits the means of exercising the
power.
c.

The "Exercising Documents" Were On Their Face Preliminary
To The Exercise Of The Option.
It is a well established rule of law in Utah that

an option is a contin"J.ing offer which must be unconditionally
and unequivocally accepted.

Cummings v. England, 12 Utah

2d 69, 362 P.2d 584 (1961);

Williams v. Espey, 11 Utah 2d

I

317, 358 P.2d 903 (1961); Tilton v. Sterling Coal and Coke Co.,
28 Utah 173, 77 P. 758 (1904).

Breen v. Mayne, 118 N.W.

440 (Iowa) states that rule as follows:
It will not do to establish a rule in these
cases which will allow an optionee to play
fast and loose as interest may dictate. The
acceptance of the option on the election when
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.I

made, must be unqualified and unequivocal, must
be to the party giving the option in no uncertain
manner, and be such that after it is exercised
it becomes binding upon the party exercising . . .
(118 N.W. at 441).
In Un.ited States Gypsum Co. v. Mackey Wallplaster Co., 252 F.
397

(9th Cir. 1918), an optionee was required to give

written notice two months in

advan~e

to terminate an option

to purchase, which would otherwise bind him.

The optionee

wrote the following letter within the requisite time period:
Dear Sir: On May 5th our option to purchase
your mill property at Great Falls expires. I
am writing you in advance of that date to inform
you that conditions in Montana at this time are
such that it will be necessary for us to cancel
our arrangement with you at the time of its expiration, which is July 5th. We have had men
looking for gypsum almost constantly since our
last meeting, and so far our efforts have been
fruitless.
If you care to come down and talk
the matter over, we will be glad to do so.
Expect to give you formal notice on May 5th
that we do not care to purchase your property.
(252 F. at 400).
The Mackey Court determined that inspite of the letter's
earlier sta::ement "I am writing you in advance ... to inform
you ... that it will be necessary for us to cancel our
at the time of expiration . .

arrangement

II

the

inclusion of the last sentence in the letter, "[e]xpect
to give you formal notice on May 5th that we do not care
to purchase your property" qualified the entire letter,
rendering it merely precatory and insufficient as notice
required

~o

terminate the option.

In so holding, the Mackey

Court concluded:
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(E]vidently the writer of the letter well understood the necessity for formal notice as required
by the terms of the agreement, and was careful not
to give such a notice, which, of course, would
have been of binding force.
(Id. at 400)
Not unlike Mackey, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in Shellhart v.
Axford, 485 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1971) confronted a situation
where written notice was required to exercise an option.

In

Shellhart, a letter from the optionee's attorney stated in
pertinent part:
This letter shall constitute that notice, however, the actual exercise of the option will
not occur until sometime before December 1,
1969. (485 P.2d at 1033.)
The Shellhart Court heid that this was an ineffectual attempt
to exercise the option, the letter's precatory language not
binding the optionee to perform.

In the instant case, respon-

dent Robert Klein successfully advanced the proposition that
his letter of March 30, 1971, to Wanda Sandberg along with
a tender of $2,000.00 constituted the exercise of the
option.

An analysis of the letter, however, shows that it was

only preliminary to the exercise of the option.

In the very

first paragraph of the subject letter, Klein states:
[T)here are one or two matters that should be
considered preparatory to my exercising the
option and the delivery of title to a portion of
the land designated by the option.
(R. 71)
Thus, the facially apparent

pu~pose

of the letter is to present

and propose matters preparatory to the exercise of the option.
This paragraph sets the tenor of the letter.

The succeeding

paragraphs further evince that the purpose of the letter is
to resolve certain matters preparatory to the exercise of the
option.
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Respondent's purported exercise of the option is
apparently based upon the statement contained in the first
full paragraph on the second page of the subject letter
(R.

7~)

which recites that on or before June 15, 1971, total

option payments of $18,000.00 will have been tendered,
which, along with a tender of $2,000.00 to exercise the
option would allow for the release of 55 acres to the
optionee pursuant to a formula contained in paragraph 5(e)
of the Option Agreement.

It should be noted that Klein

has admitted under oath that the total payments made under
the Option Agreement were only $17,000.00.

R. 339, AnRK No.l R. 66-67)

(See ARK

~12,

Respondent, therefore was

apparently anticipating not only a $2,000.00 down payment
but also an additional payment of $1,000.00 to extend the
option and therefore included that amount in his calculation.
The additional $1,000.00 was never tendered.
also speaks of a release of 55 acres of land.

The letter
Application

of the Option Agreement's formula to determine the number
of acres which could have been released to Klein had a
proper exercise occurred reveals that on the basis of actual
payments tendered as of the purported exercise in June of
1971, Klein could have demanded release of only 52.5 acres.
That the letter speaks of necessary future events and
assumes their occurrence as of the date of the exercise
indicates

t~at

the letter was preliminary.

That the letter is both precatory and preparatory
in nature is further evinced by its enumeration of matters
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Klein expects to be accomplished prior to the exercise of
the option.

For example, the penultimate paragraph on page

2 of the letter states as follows:
During the months of April and May of 1971 I think
we should try to accomplish the following:
1.
2.

3.

Have survey made to determine the exact amount
of acreage to be sold.
Arrive at the exact selling price so as to be
be able to determine the exact amount of principal that will be due and payable during a
period of 10 annual installments.
Prepare a land purchase agreement consistant
[sic] with the terms of an option agreement
and the accepted number of acres involved
consistant [sic] with the survey that will
have previously been prepared.
(R. 72 (emphasis added))

That Klein knew that the letter could not be a valid exercise
is conclusively shown by his statement that a land purchase
agreement needed to be prepared consistent with the terms of
the Option Agreement.

Klein knew what was required to properly

exercise the option if, in fact, he so elected.

Construing

the letter, however, as a whole, it is apparent that it is
nothing more than a statement of intent and of matters to
be accomplished

befor~

exercising the option and in no way

binds defendant Robert Klein to purchase the property.
(Note, that letter is unsigned in the record before the Court.)
In Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P.2d 974 (1954), the

Utah Supreme Court held that a statement that a party intends
to do something is not the same thi.ng as doing it.

This is

clearly a foundation of option law, which requires strict
compliance from the party seeking specific performance.
Analytically, the letter cannot bear the burden of the option's
exercise
and
does
not
establish
theServices
requisite
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mutuality to bind the optionee.

See POINT VIII, infra.

As this letter is clearly not the unequivocal,
unconditional acceptance of an option required by Utah law,
it in no way binds Klein to any type of performance.

Fur-

ther, not only has there been no evidence that Wanda Sandberg accepted the letter as the exercise of the option, it
was stipulated as fact that at no time did she waive the
proper tender of a contract as the exercise of the option.
(AWS, R. 355; T. 6:29-7:3, R. 399)
d.

The Tender of The Real Estate Contract in June of 1972
Was Not Timely_.
An option, as previously stated, is a continuing

offer which must be unconditionally accepted.

Cummings v.

England, 12 Utah 2d 69, 362 P.2d 584 (1961); Williams v. Espey,
11 Utah 2d 317, 358 P.2d 903 (1961); R.J. Dallm Const. Co. v.
Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 3'17 (1952).

Specifically,

the exercise of an option must be made in the manner prescribed by law or specified in the option agreement.

Time-

liness of the exercise is material and has been said to be
the essence of the option whether or not the option so states.
For example, in Kelsey v. Crowther, 7 Utah 519, 27 P. 695
(1891), the Utah Supreme Court stated that an option period
of 30 days did not mean 31 days and plaintiffs having
failed to exercise the option in the 30 days lost their
right to enforce the option.

Likewise, in Gibbs v. Morgan,

101 Utah 66, 118 P.2d 128 (1941), the Utah Supreme Court
stated that since an option had not been exercised within the
90-day period 8iven thereunder, it could not be gpecifically
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enforced.

In a recent case, Wulfenstein v. Larson, 527 P.2d

650 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court dealt with an option
agreement that required

written notice of its exercise.

The optionors did not actually come into possession of the
notice until six days after the expiration date,

though the

notice had been mailed two days prior to the expiration date
of the option.

The postal service was not able to deliver

it at that time and had tir:iely left a "notice of attempted
delivery" at the address.

Six days later the defendants

picked up the letter at the post office.

The Court held,

that, under these circumstances, the requirement of notice r,ad
been timely given.

6

In the instant case execution and submission of a
real estate purchase contract was specifically required
to exercise the option.

The maximum period of duration of

the Option Agreement was approximately 18 years from the
date of the signing of the option which was September 21,

1964.

(R. 59, 60)

The continuing validity of the option,

however, was conditioned upon making certain payments.
Paragraph 3 of the Option Agreement provides as follows:
3. The follo'lving payments as rr.ade and as to be
made shall be required to keep their option in
good standing:

6

The decision may have been based on the 'mailbox rule'

whi~h states that the time of acceptance is when the letter

delivered over to the post office or the Court may have
felt that the letter was constructivelv received by the optionr·
before expiration of the option.
~1atever the grounds it is
apparent that timeliness was crucial and that there were
adequate grounds for finding the exercise timely.
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a. Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) on June
14, 1962, receipt of which is herebv acknowledged as the original consideration for the
option.
Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) on December 14, 1962, receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged.

b.

c. One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) on June
14, 1963, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and
d. The sum of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00)
on June 14, 1963, and the sum of One Thousand
Dollars ($1,000.00) each six (6) months thereafter
(i.e. each December 14 and June 14) until the
option is exercised or until the expiration of
the option period, unless the purchase price is
sooner paid in full." (R. 60(emµhasis added)).
Summarizing $1,000.00 was to be paid each six (6)
months on or before December 14, and on or before June 14 to
maintain the option in good standing for the next
six months.

~uceeding

The use of the term "shall be" in p.Hagraµh 3 makes

such payments mandatory to keep the option in effect.

Respondent

Klein has already admitted his failure to tender $1,000.00 on
June 14, 1971, which caused the Option Agreement to expire on
that date, his last payment to extend the option being made on
or before December 14, 1970. (AnRK Nos. 1,4,7,9, & 13, R.66-69).
It is hornbook law that con:>ideration tendered
to maintain the option in good standing is separate and
distinct from consideration given under the contract formed
, when the option is exercised. Ide v. Leiser, 10 Mont. 5,
24 P. 695 (!8981, see also, 77 Am.Jur.
~34

(1975).

Vender and Purchaser

Thus respondent cannot assert that the pay-

ment of $2,000.00 tendered on June 3, 1971, bearing
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the notation "doi;..111 payment to co11U11ence June 15 agreement 1971"
was intended or accepted as payment to extend the option.
In fact, respondent Klein has never so contended.

(AnRK Nos.

1, 4, 7, 9 and J.3, R. 66-69)
Appellants contend that under Utah law, Klein was
required to present a contract of purchase executed by
him as grantee while the option was still in good standing.
Mrs. Sandberg never waived this requirement, such fact
being stipulated to by both parties.
7: 3, R. 399)

(AWS, R. 355; T. 6: 29-

As the last payment to maintain the option

in good standing was made on December 14, 1970, an exercise
must have occurred prior to June 14, 1971 to be timely.
Thus, the presentation of an executed contract on May 16,
1972, more than eleven months after the expiration of the
option is a defective exercise.
is material.

Under Utah law timeliness

The respondent Klein contends that timeliness

is excused because of the difficulty encountered

in com-

pleting the terms of the purchase contract, specifically
the description of lands to be included thereunder and
the purchase price to be determined from the total acreage
thereof.

The Option Agreement, however, had been in effect

in one form or another for over nine years when it expired,
and it expressly provided that any expenses incurred by Klein
could be applied against the purchase price.
excuse for Klein's delay.

There was no

Any "agreement" to the contrary

is parol and extraneous to the Option Agreement and would
materially alter it, and again Klein has already stipulated
thatSponsored
at byno
time
did
Mrs.
Sandberg
request
himand Library
to Services
refrain
the S.J.
Quinney Law
Library.
Funding for
digitization provided by
the Institute of Museum
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-76-

from submitting contracts as required under the Option
Agreement.
e.

(AWS

n,

R. 355; T. 6:29-7:3, R. 399)

The "Exercising" Documents Were in Fact a Counteroffer.
It is a basic principle of contract law that an

offer must be accepted on the terms on which it was made;
any alteration of such offer is tantamount to rejection of
the original offer and the making of a counteroffer.
C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser §10 (1975)

Similarly, this

principle of contract law is applicable to options.
example, in
Products

~ard

C~,

91

For

Lumber & Investment Co. v. Construction

255 P.2d 473 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953)

a lessor of real property and machinery granted his lessee
an option to renew the lease for a period of two years.

Inunedi-

ately prior to the expiration of the option, the lessee wrote
the lessor a letter, the material part of which reads as
follows:
We are continuing our lease in accordance
with our lease contract for the year 1951 for
the factory and the machinery and tools.
255 P.2d at 475.
Because the lessee attempted to renew the option for only a
one-year period instead of two, the lessor notified the lessee
that the lessee had failed to properly exercise the option
to renew the lease provision of the agreement.

The California

Appellate Court, ruling on the lessor's objection, held as

The determination that defendant's attempted exercised of the option was not in accordance
with the agreement is consistent with the settled
principle, 'applicable to options as to other
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contracts, that the offer must be accepted
in the terms in which it is made, and the
alteration of such terms ... is tantamount to
a rejection of the original offer and the
making of a counter-offer.' (Id. at 466-467
(citations omitted)).
The Ha~_Q Court further stated,
To avail himself of an option of renewal
given cy a lease, a tenant must apprise the
lessor in unequivocal terms of his unqualified intention to exercise his option in the
precise terms permitted by the lease.
32
Am.Jur, Sec. 979 p.822.
. In the matter
at bar, however, a judgment against defendant was based upon its failure to exercise
the option as required by its particular
terms. An optjon is an offer by which a
promisor binds himself in advance to make
a contract if the optionee accepts upon
the rerms and within the time designated
in the option.
Since th~_QEtioner is bou~_s!
while the optionee Tstree to accep_! or not
as he chooses, courts are strict in holding
an opt io:1ee to exact C0.'.!1£ liance v. i tb the terms
of the_ont~on.
Wightman v. Hall, 7-17 Pac.
58Q1T9 2~ By varying the terms of the
option in his purported renewal, defendant
in effect rejected the option which became
extinguished with the expiration of the terms
of the lease.
(Id. at 477-478(emphasis added))
This rule is also the law in Utah.

For example, in

Tilton v. Sterling Coal and Coke Co., et. al., 28 Utah 173,
77 P. 758 (1904), the Utah Supreme Court stated that an option
granted in a lease was not accepted, because the optionee required, as a condition of his acceptance, that the optioner do
more than called for by the lease, in effect attempting to expand the nature of the optionor's performance.

Noting that

conditional acceptance of an option amounts to a practical
rejection of it, the Utah Supreme Court further quoted an
early treatise which states the rule as follows:

"The

respondent is at liberty to accept wholly or to reject
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wholly; but one of these things he must do, for if he answers,
not

rejec~ing,

but proposing to accept under some modifications,

this is a rejection of the offer."
in

Cho~rnos

28 Utah at 179.

Similarly,

v. Evona Inv. Co., 97 Utah 335, 94 P.2d 470 (1939),

an option provided two individuals as joint lessees a first
right of refusal should the lessor receive an offer to purchase
the leased property.

The son of one of the joint lessees

subsequently offered to purchase the property.

Chournos, the

other joint lessee, appeared at the lessor's office and
tendered the required purchase price and requested a deed for
himself.

He was advised that this could not be done.

He

then tendered one-half of the purchase price and requested a
deed to one-half of the property.
this could not be done.

He was again advised that

The conversation proceeded

~nd

the

time rolled past 12:00 o'clock, the deadline for exercising
the option.

The lessor then advised Chournos that all ten-

ders were off as the deadline had passed.

The Utah Supreme

Court held that both the request that a deed be made to
Chournos only and not to Chournos and the other joint
lessee and the subsequent tender of one-half of the price
and request for one·-half of the property amounted to rejections
of the offer and the making of a counteroffer.
The letter of March 30, 1971, from Defendant Klein
to Mrs. Sandberg, was held by the lower court to constitute,
(t~ 6 e~~er

with a check for $2,000.00 delivered and paid on

June 3, 1971,) the exercise of the option.
R. 358)

(Order, ,7,

The letter itself, however, not only is precatory
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in nature but further proposes that an annexation description
corresponding only "within a few feet" of the Option Agreernent' s description be purchased and that Mrs. Sandberg participate in the cost of a survey, even though paragraph Sh
of the Option Agreement provides that such costs may be
applied by respondent against the contract purchase price.
(R. 71- 73, see also POINT VI, supra; R.

63)

As such, the

letter is not only precatory in nature, but constitues a
counteroffer to the original Option Agreement.
Bv merely changing the legal description of the
property in the purported exercise of the option, and proposing additional obligations for Mrs. Sandberg, respondent
Klein rejected the original offer, and extended a counteroffer.

Clearly, this is not an exercise of the option since

it varied from its preferred terms.

It is telling that

although the lower court found many cf the terms of the
letter binding as against Mrs. Sandberg and further found
the letter to properly express the understanding of the
parties, it did not assess half of the costs of Mr. Stevens'
survey, subsequently requested by Klein, against her.
(Order, ~7. R. 358)
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POINT VIII
THE LACK OF MUTUALITY BELIES THE CREATION
OF AN AGREEMEHT BY THE LETTER OF MARCH 30, 1971,
AND THE TENDERED CHECK OF JUNE 1971
Respondent Klein, and the lower court felt that th2
March 30, 1971, letter and the $2,000.00 check constituted
an exercise of the Option Agreement and that an enforceable
contract was made between the parties.

The lack of mutuality

belies the creation of a contract between the parties.

Their

lack of mutuality is due to the vagueness of the exercising
documents and particularly to the existence

of ambiguities in

the Option Agreement, and "exercising letter".
In contrast to the land selection provision of the
Option Agreement which required a future agreement in all
circumstances, two other clauses in the Option Agreement
require a future agreement though only in the alternative.
For example, paragraph 5 (e) provides for release of land upon
selection by the Buyer of contiguous parcels or upon agreement
of the parties if non-contiguous releases are sought.

It states

as follows:
Land to be released shall be selected by the
Buyer provided such land is contiguously selected or otherwise mutually agreed to by both
parties. (R.62)
Another provision for future mutual agreement as an
alternative to specified terms is found in paragraph S(b) regarding the down payment on the contract contemplated by the option.
That paragraph states as follows:
The Buyer shall pay a down payment of Two Thousand
Dollars ($2,000.00) (or such other amount as the
parties may agree) on said contract. . . . (R. 61)
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Again this drafting clearly provides for future mutual agreement as an alternative to a specified payment of $2,000.00
and thus, it is not comparable to the land selection provision
either in structure nor in intent.
While otherwise specific provisions requiring the
necessity of future agreement only in the alternative would
seemingly not require a contract to be declared uneforceable
unless that alternative were invoked, some courts have
indicated that the mere existence of such an alternative renders such a written instrument unforceable as clearly lacking
the requisite mutuality of obligation.

Simply stated these

courts find that where an alternative exists requiring future
mutual agreement the written instrument is unenforceable.
For example, the Kline v. Rogerson decision, supra,
found a contract fatally deficient when it provided for annual
payments of $5,000.00 per year or in an amount agreed to by
the parties.

When the buyer refused to pay $5, 000. 00 per year,

but was willing to pay $2, 000. 00 per year, the court found
that the seller could not compel the buyer to pay $5,000.00
per year and found the contract uneforceable.
In Utah it has been held that an unconditional acceptance of an offer specifying payment in a lump sum, or alterna- '
1

tively, on installments does not create an enforceable agreemen:
For example, in Candland v. Oldroyd, 67 Utah 605, 248 P. 1101

(1926), the Utah Supreme Court considered whetl1er an enforceable
contract had arisen from an unconditional acceptance of an
offer to sell land for $1,300.00 in cash or for $1,400.00 on
terms specifically set forth.

The buyer's accep•:ance failed t
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1
'

indicate whether the acceptance applied to the cash offer or
the offer stated in terms.

On the basis of the written

documents, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
How could Oldroyd [Seller], or how could anyone,
determine that Candland accepted to buy for cash
or that he proposed to buy on payments to be
made at stated times? How could Oldroyd determine,
on receipt of Candland's communication . . .
whether he had sold his farm for cash or on time?
We do not see how it can be said with any degree
of certainty from the writings--and the rights of
these parties must be determined from these
writings--that the minds of the parties ever met
on a sale for $1,300 in cash or on a sale $1,400
on time.
There is nothing in the letter of respondent
Candland, sc.ve the statemen:: that he accepts "your
proposition" indicating which of the offers he had
accepted. (248 P. at 1102)
In Candland, the Utah Supreme Court succinctly stated
the doctrine of mutuality of obligation as it relates to the
remedy of specific performance.
Let us assume that Candland had refused to go
forward and nurchase the uropertv, and that
Oldroyd had instituted an-aciian· for suecific
performance and had alleged that the offer had
been made and acc·epted in the language found in
the letters. Upon what theory could he have
enforced specific performance? Would it have
been upon the theory that Candland was to buy
for cash or upon time? Whatever right Oldroyd
had in an action of that nature must and would
have been adjudged and determin2d from the writing found in the two letters.
In what way could
he have proven that respondent had elected to
contract either for a cash payment or on time?
A contract to be binding upon one must likewise
be binding upon the other.
If one party has a
right to insist upon specific performance, the
other party to the contract must likewise have
the same right.
Tested by the elementary considerations that enter into every contract, we are
unable to conclude that any contract existed
growing out of this correspondence (248 P. 1103)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-83-

In the instant case, the lower court held that by
the letter dated March 30, 1971, with the tender of $2,000.00
respondent Klein had exercised the Option Agreement and was
entitled to specific performance thereon.

If the letter and
Ag~eement,

the check represent the acceptance of the Option

giving rise to a contract between the parties, then as of the
date of Klein's "acceptance" both Kleir. and Mrs. Sandberg must
have had enforceable obligations.

If there was a contract,

there would have been mutuality of obligation.

The salient

question is, what would a court have found had Mrs. Sandberg
sued,

allegin~

the Option Agreement and the letter and check

as a contract against Klein?

Obviously, the proof of a

contract would be deficient.as the letter is ambivalent,
contradicts

t~e

Option Agreement, requests additional terms,

proposes future agreement, is an unintegrated document, and
is unsigned in the record before the Court.

Likewise, in a

suit by Klein, the proof is deficient.
Considering the issue of mutuality of obligation
let us again examine the letter of March 30, 1971.

It should

first be noted that there is no evidence in the record that the '
March 30, 1971, letter was ever

signed by Klein.

Therefore,

that document could not have been relied upon by Mrs. Sandberg
in a claim against Klein.

That letter, according to Mr. Klein,

represents his acceptance of the Option Agreement.

However,

bearing no signature as it appears in the file, it could not
have been relied on as an acceptance or exercise by Mrs.
Sandberg in an action against the respondent.

Further, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-84-

letter refers to three enclosures, only one of which, the
annexation plat (as ratified in May of 1971 by the St. George
City Council), is in the file.
docum<::nt.

Thus, it also is an unintegrated

While Klein has subsequently executed other documents

upon which he could be charged, none of those documents came
into existence until after the expiration of the option and are
untimely.

There was, therefore, no mutuality of contract within

the option period.
The terms of the letter are so equivocal as to
prevent any enforcement by Mrs. Sandberg.

Not only does the

first paragraph fail to indicate a present exercise of the
option, it specifically speaks in precatory terms regarding
preparations necessary to the contemplated exercise of the
Option Agreement in the future.
The second, third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of the
letter discussed supra in Points Vb, VI, VIIc further indicate
Klein's understanding that the property to be sold needed to
be agreed to and that it had not on March 30, 1971, been described to the satisfaction of either party.

In fact in para-

graph 5 of that letter defendant Klein states as follows:
Should you still have some apprehension that I
am not aware of, I am sure that on a face to
face basis and with the help of a surveyor we
can resolve fairly to each of our satisfaction
whatever diffenences [sic] of opinion we may
encounter.
It is tellin8 that over a year later, respondent's attorney
indicated that the property description still had not been
fully resolved.

(R.115)
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The trial court's finding that the March 30, 1971
letter along with the $2,000.00 check bearing the notation
"down payment on June 15, agreement 1971 was an unequivocal
and clear exercise of the Option Agreement flies in the face of
the physical facts of this case and it cannot be said that
Wanda Sandberg could have bound Klein to purchase anything on
the basis of that letter and that tender of $2,000.00, because
on June 15, 1971, there was no memorandum sufficient on which
to seek specific performance against Klein.

Simply stated,

the letter is vague, ambivalent, and contradictory.

Unsigned

in the record before the Court, it is also unintegrated, two
of the referenced documents therein not in the record, or in the
appellants' possession.

Further, the letter proposes future

agreement and seeks to impose additional terms on Mrs. Sandberg.
PART FOUR - SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT OF THE REAL ESTATE
CONTRACT WAS IMPROPER
POINT IX
RESPONDENT'S REAL ESTATE. PURCHASE CONTRACT IS NOT
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE OPTION AGREEMENT
The lower court decreed specific performance on a real
estate purchase contract prepared by Klein nearly a year
after the Option Agreement expired.
R. 358).

(Order ~4 & Ill of Conclusionc:

The court may have felt that enforcing a real estate

contract would at least appear to conform with the terms of the
option which specifically required the creation of just such
an instrument.

Also, a decree of specific performance on a

real estate contract is much more expeditious than a decree on
the Option Agreement as purportedly exercised, with explanato0
parol documents.

Those documents are so vague and uncert.1in
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I

that enforcement of a document unsigned by the party to
be charged, created almost one year after the expiration of
the option it would

p~rport

to exercise, was that the real

estate contract was "in conformity" with the Option Agreement
in hoth description and consideration.

true.
a.

(Order'' 4

Nothing could be less

& 5, R.358).

Land Descriptions on The Real Estate Purchase Contract and
Option Agreement are Not in Conformity.
It is undisputed by the parties that the original

Earnest Money Receipt which preceded the Option Agreement and
was superseded by it pertained to the following property:
All land owned by the Sellers in Section,
21, 22 and 27, Township 42 South, Range 15
West, S.L.M., consisting, so far as the parties
can det:ermine at this time of approximately 500
acres.
Not including any water or water ·rights
and less the following:
There is now a.reservoir constructed by the
City of St. George on what the parties believe to
be the Northeast quarter Northeast quarter of
Section 22, and there is an old fence running
north and south west of this reservoir.
The
sellers intend 'to reserve from said sale all land
in said Section 22 which lies east of said fence
line, it being understood that the exact line
will have to be determined if and when the option
hereinafter mentioned is executed. (R. 196 (emphasis
added)).
Two and one-half years after the Earnest Money Receipt was
signed, the parties replaced it with an Option Agreement,
drawn and prepared by respondent, that by its terms formally
set forth the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement together
i·T:!. th

modifications to which the parties had agreed.

14, R.69; R.59).

(AnRK No.

The Option Agreement prescribed a certain

mode of exercising the option therein, said mode being discussed
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previously and entc:>.iling the execution of a contract of
purchase for land to be mutually selected from the following
description:
[A]ll land owned by the Sellers in Section 21, Section 22 and Section 27 of Township 42 South, RanPe
15 West, Salt Lake Base and ~1eridian, consisting"'
of approximately 500 acres, which property shall
be more particularly described in Schedule A
attached hereto, to be signed by the parties and
made a part hereof for all purposes; not includinp,
any water or water rights, and excluding all land
in the Northeast One Quarter of the Northeast One
Quarter of Section 22, which lies East of the old
fence line, which runs North and Southwest of
the City of St. George reservoir, said excluded
property also to be more particularly described
in Schedule A attached hereto and made n oart
hereof for all purposes.
.
It is clear from the two descriptions set forth
that the Earnest Money Receipt and the Option Agreement do
not pertain to the same parcel.

(See Point VI, supra).

Furthermore, the description of the tract to be attached and
subscribed to the Option Agreement as Exhibit A is nonexistent.
The lower court can neither create that exhibit for the parties
nor sign Mrs. San-::iberg's name to it.

Certainly, the 'Exhibit

A' describing the land to be purchased by re3pondent in his
contract of 1972 does not conform, as that contract excludes
land in the SE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22 as well as the NE 1/4
NE 1/4, and certainly does not bear Mrs. Sandberg's signature.
(R.170).

Succintly stated, the Option Agreement is not an

integrated document.
The respondent drew and prepared the Option Agreement.
(AnRK No. 14, R.69).

Mrs. Sandberg, on the other hand, was

not even aware in 1976 what possessing land in fee meant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-88-

(DWS 4:30-5:4, R. 398).

The nonintegration of the document,

therefore, should be fatally construed against Klein, the
drafter, real estate man and developer.
Although, the letter of March 30, 1971 is incompetent
evidence to clarify the nature of the nonexistent 'Exhibit A',
let us assume, arguendo, that that letter provides the means
for accurately platting the phantom description.

After all,

the lower court considered the letter sufficient along with
the respondent's payment in June of 1971 to timely exercise the
option.

(Order

~7.

R. 358).

In referring to a fenceline

spoken of in the Earnest Money Agreement and the Option Agreement, the letter states as follows:
My interpreation of the number of acres essentially
corresponds with yours, namely that the land Wayne
intended to sell lies west of the fence line that
you and I have both seen together. I would like
you to know that I can appre:iate your concern
that this line be .agreed to by both of us . .
I walked the fence line the other day and noted that
it has some irregular jogs in it that you and I
should probab~y discuss in order to assure absolute clarificatipn. I see no problem in this
connection as I am as a matter of personal principle disposed to agree with your wishes.
If you think about it, descriptions along section
or quarter section lines generally are more easily
handled. It is for this reason, after careful review that I have discribed [sic] the annexation
description as indicated by the plat which I am
including with this letter. This description within a few feet, corresponds with the fence line
that you and I have observed together when we
last saw each other. This I trust will correspond
with your own interpretation of what land you in
fact believe vou are selling. Should you still
have some apprehension that I am not aware of, I
am sure that on a face to face basis and with the
help of a surveyor we can resolve fairly to each
of our satisfaction whatever diffenences [sic] of
opinion we may encounter. (R. 71-72(emphasis added)).
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While the Earnest Money Agreement and the Option
Agreement do not conform in what areas east of a fenceline
are to be excluded, the former referring to all lands in
Section 22 east of a fenceline, and the latter only to lanJ
in the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22 east of a fenceline,

the

letter proposes an enclosed annexation description correspondin:
only "within a few feet" to "the fence line".

Thus, at its

very best, the enclosed annexation description only approxi~1oney

mated the fenceline descriptions in both the Earnest

Agreement and the Option Agreement as respondent understood

the~.

The last sentence in the letter adds a final touch
of ambivalence to 1vhat clearly constitutes a counteroffer
and proposal for agreement.

That sentence states as follows:

You will note that_l__am or:i]y___EI__o_Qosinq that land
oeannexea 1vhich I am in fact buying from vou.
(R. 73 (emphasis added")).
The proposed annexation linen was executed by
Robert Klein and Wanda Sandberg on April 5, 1971.

(ARK HI+ ,R 33''

The same linen, bearinr; the notation "Holidaire Lands Inc.
addition to St. George City" and signed by respondent as
President of Holidaire Lands Inc. appears in the record on
page 109 and in the probate record at page 83.
two sets of 80's in the probate record).

(Note, there are

Its appearance is

altered from that of March 30th, 1971, because, as he proposed
respondent was successful in causing those lands to be
annexed to the City of St. George and the Exhibits in the
file bear the city's subsequent approval.
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(MRK, R.

289).
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Apparently, to confirm the last sentence of the March 30th
letter, Klein has, urider oath, stated that that plat dealt
with the real property that was the subject matter of the
lawsuit (ARK H4, R. 339), and that "he was buying approximately 450 acres described in the Holidaire Lands annexation
plat and the option agreement dated September 21, 1964."
(Anll4RK 2c, R.151).

Though the lower court apparently did

not take the time to verify whether the Exhibit A to
respondent's real estate purchase contract (R. 121) corresponded
to the annexation description, this Court, with its power to
review the facts in equity cases can, and, indeed, must review
these Exhibits.

And, in reviewing them, this Court will dis-

cover that respondent's real estate purchase contract of
1972 (R. 117-121) covers approximately seventy (70) acres
less ground than the annexation.

(See Point VI, supral·

Clearly, respondent sbught to purchase in 1972 less
ground than was annexed, less than he proposed to buy in
1971 when the option was still effective, and when the lower
court ruled he had exercised the option.

To allow the

respondent to play this fast, and this loose, and then to
allow the discrepancies in the descriptions to go unnoticed
is to impose the renpondent's ambivalence upon Mrs. Sandberg
a~d

b~y

whatever his latest request is, well, that will be

.
. h us. 7
f ine
wit

7 As stated, the most serious discrepancy between the
Option Agreement and the "exercising"letter, and the real
estate purchase contract is the disparity of the land
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b.

The Real Estate Purchase Contract and the Jption Agreement
are Not in Conformity as to the Necessity of Future
Agreement.
The real estate purchase contract also ignores the

Option Agreement's clear requirement for the mutual agreement
of the parties on many terms, the most important of which is
the amount of land to be subject to any contract of sale
exercising the option.

Though the Option Agreement states

that it covers a certain amount of land, less a reserved area
for the optionor, it is clear that the future agreement of
the parties is required as to the amount of land to be subject
to any contract of sale.

The parties have never agreed to

the amount of land Klein proposes in the contract.

In this

respect also the contract is not in conformity with the
Option Agreement.

descriptions. The argumenc at Point VI, supra, has noted that
the area reserved for Mrs. Sandberg under the Option Agreement
was approximately 40 acres in the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22
while the area reserved for her under the contract is approximately 70 acres in the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 and in the SE 1/4 NE 1/4
of Section 22, both of which vary from the annexation plat.
The two possible reasons for these differences are that Klein
is proposing an exercise as to only a part of the property
subject to the Option Agreement or that Klein simply was confused as to the location of fence which defined the boundary
of the reserved parcel. There is no evidence that the fence
surveyed by Klein is the fence spoken of in the Earnest Money
Receipt and Option Agreement. There are some indications that
it is not the proper fence line. For example, the descriptions
of the fence in those two documents refer to the fence as being
north and southwest of a reservoir. The fence Klein platted,
however, runs straight north and south and could not be both
north and southwest of any single point. Also, the fence
referred to in the Option Agreement is only in the NE 1/4
~E 1/4 of Section 22 while the fence Klein has surveyed is
~n both the NE 1/4 and SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of Section 22.
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c.

The Real Estate Purchase Contract and the Option Agreement
are not in conformity as to Time Requirements.
The real estate purchase contract proposes that the

first annual payment thereunder be made on June 15, 1972.
The Option Agreement required that the first annual payment under
any contract of exercise be made one year after the date of the
contract's execution.

The date Klein submitted the real estate

purchase contract was May 16, 1972.

This indicates that the

payment of the first annual installment is not properly scheduled.
Assuming, however, that Klein meant by designating the first payment for June 15, 1972, that there was a contract between the
parties one year prior to that date (i.e., on .June 15, 1971),
it is apparent that the supposed prior contract is at least a
day late, for the option expired, at the latest, at midnight
on June 14, 1971, when the six month extension paid for on
December 14, 1970, expired.

Even in his attempt to substan-

tiate a fabricated parol c0ntract, Klein is untimely, and
the real estate purchase

cont~act

is again not in conformity

with the Option Agreement.
d.

The Real Estate Purchase Contract and the Option Agreement
are Not in Conformity as to Manner of Exercise.
Another discrepancy in the real estate purchase con-

tract is found in the self-serving statements respondent makes
therein to a purported exercise of the Option Agreement in
1971.

(R.117). For reasons already presented at POINT VII,

supra, the letter and check of March and June,1971, respectively were not a valid exercise of the Option Agreement.
Option Agreement clearly specifies that exercise is to be
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The

made by execution of a real estate contract. (R. 61)

No other

documents or action will constitute a valid exercise.

The

real estate purchase contract thus contradicts the clear
requirement of
e.

th~

Option Agreement.

The Real Estate Purchase Contract and the 0 tion A reement
are Not in Con ormity as to Consideration.
The real estate purchase contract submitted by

Klein recites that in addition to the $2,000.00 paid in
June, 1971, an additional amount of $18,000.00 was paid
under the Option Agreement and is to be acknowledged by Mrs.
Sandberg as prior payment toward the total purchase price of
$86,368.00.

(R.118,

1[~

2,2a & 2b) Paragraph Sa of the Option

Agreement allowed that all payments made under it, "including
payments made for and during the extension period, shall apply
on the contract purchase price."

(R.61)

Therefore, in the

real estate purchase contract Klein reduced the total purchase
price by $18,000.00 purportedly paid to maintain the Option
Agreement in good standing and by the $2,000.00 down payment
made in June of 1971.

These amounts correspond to the amounts

Klein, in his letter of March, 1971, believed would be paid
as of the date of his exercise of the option.

Respondent,

however, has later admitted under oath that he paid only
$17,000 under the Option Agreement, not including the $2,C'00.00
in June'.

(ARK H2, R. 339; AnRK No.

1_,

R.66-67; & MRK ~4, R.270

Thus, even assuming the description in Exhibit A to the real
estate purchase contract were somehow correct, and e"ven
assuming the contract had been timely tendered (both of which
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assumptions strain even a creative imagination), the consideration recited therein and due Mrs. Sandberg thereunder
would be and is insufficient'.

Succintly, the $86,368.00

total price recited in the real estate purchase contract minus
$19,0GG.OG is not equal to $66,368.00 recited as the balance
remaining due, but rather $67,368.00.
Clearly, there is no basis for the lower court's
finding that the real estate purchase contract was in conformity "both as to description and consideration with the
Option Agreement."

(Order 114, R. 358).

The facts and simple mathematics belie the accuracy
of the lower court's findings.

The decree of specific perfor-

mance on that contract (R. 358, Conclusions

~l)

is onerous

a~:

to Mrs. Sandberg because its terms are so different from
those of the Option Agreemen't which bears her signature.

The

lower court's decree of specific enforcement of a document
which is insufficient in consideration, proposes unilaterally
drafted terms, lacks Mrs. Sandberg's agreement as to land
descriptions, and was conceived by respondent almost one year
after the option expired,must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Appellants seek reversal of the summary judgment
declaring the Option Agreement a valid and enforceable contract and decreeing specific performance of that agreement
in conformity to a real estate purchase contract submitted
to the lower court by respondent.
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Because respondent's claim for relief was bottomed
in equity and due to the fact that the lower court ruled
favorably on respondent's motion for summary judgment, this
Court must consider both the facts and the law in this case,
must do it without favor to the findings below, and must
draw inferences in favor of the appellant.

Only the applica-

tion of these standards, as established by both statutory and
case law, will afford the appellant her day in cot:rt.
The nature of a decree of specific performance requires
cl.:!ar and certain proof as to all of the material terms of a
contract, and it is the respondent who bears this burden.
In the instant case, the document3 presented by respondent as the basis for his claim include an

Ear~est

Money

Receipt executed by appellant in 1962 and an Option Agreement
executed in 1964 that superseded the Earnest Money Receipt.
Only these documents bear the appellant's signature and under
the Statute of Frauds she can be charged only with these documents.

Parol evidence, while admissable to clarify

such

writings, cannot be used to add to or subtract from their terms.
Specifically, the letter dated March 30, 1971 apparently
drafted by respondent but unsigned by him in the record before
the Court ~ be admissible to show notice of acceptance of
the option, if notice were all that was required, but not to
add to, subtract from, or alter the contractual liability of
the appellant.
The OptiJn Agreement before this Court is not a
document susceptible of specific performance.

Dravm
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and

prepared by the respondent, a man experienced in real
estate matters, it leaves material terms to the future
agreement of the parties.

Paragraph 5 of the Option Agree-

ment, for example, which specifies the manner of the option's
exercise, specifically requires the respondent to execute a
contract for "all or such part of parts of the property as
the parties may agree", leaving the selection of land to
future agreement.

In Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338,

517 P.2d 1026 (1973), this Court has already held such contracts uneforceable and, when the future agreement dealt with
the selection of land, parol evidence may not aid the deficient description. Id.

That the Option Agreement both

necessitated and contemplated future negotiations is evinced
by respondent's letter of March 30, 1971.

That letter, both

precatory in nature and wholly preparatory to the option's
exercise, reveals that respondent knew and understood that any
parcel to be selected had to be agreed upon.
The Option Agreement· respondent relies on is not an
integrated document.

On page 2 of the Agreement, it recites

that descriptions referenced therein, specifically the lands
to be purchased and excluded from the purchase, will be
attached thereto and independently
as "Schedule A".

su~scribed

No such schedule exists.

by the parties

Thus, these

descriptions which were to be an integral part of the Option
Agreement and which were of such importance to the parties as
to require mutual approval, and subsequent and independent subscription, are lacking.
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There are, however, various land descriptions
before the Court.

Two exist in the Earnest Money Receipt

and Option Agreement, both of which referred to man made
structures and require futher delineation.

A third descrip-

tion exists on an annexation plat prepared at respondent's
request, and ultimately, a fourth exists as an exhibit to
respondent's real estate purchase contract presented to the
lower court for the appellant's signature.

Respondent suc-

cessfully asserted in the lower court that the descriptions
in the Earnest ::-1oney Receipt and Option Agreement were the
same and, further, that they were identical to that
description on the real estate purchase contract.

An exami-

nation of the record will reveal that this is not true, as
those descriptions, particularly with reference to Section 22
of Township 42 South, Range 15 West, Salt Lake base and
meridian, play havoc with each other.

Further, in his letter

of March 30, 1971, respondent specifically indicated that
he was only annexing "that land which I am [he was] buying
from you [appellant]."

The option expired on June 14, 1971.

A year later, respondent submitted his real estate purchase
contract which covers approximately seventy (70) acres less
ground than the annexation.

Yet, in one breath, the lower

court held that the letter along with a tender of $2,000.00
properly exercised the option and directed that appellant sign
a real estate purchase contract submitted by respondent.

It

should be clear to this Court that a letter is not a proper
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exercise when the option specifically requires that a contract be executed.

Further, even assuming the letter were

a proper exercise, the decree below does not conform to
the terms proposed by the letter.

The respondent attached a

linen to the letter which, as subsequently ratified by the
City of St. George, appears in the file as the Holidare Lands
Addition to St. George City:

According to the respondent's

alleged letter of exercise, he was buying that land and under
oath, respondent confirmed that "he was buying approximately
450 acres described in the Holidaire Lands annexation plat
and option agreement dated September 21, 1964."

The respon-

dent's real estate purchase contract, however, which the
lower court has directed the appellant to sign and which was
attached to respondent's motion for summary judgment and
memorandum of authorities, describes a different parcel of
land'.
The respondent, who seeks specific enforcement of the
Option Agreement, bears the burden of showing that he has
strictly complied with its terms.

Paragraph 5 of the Option

Agreement specifically required that the option be exercised
by the preparation and submission of a real estate contract
on lands to be agreed upon.

The last extension payment made

to keep the option open was tendered on or before December 14,
1970 and, by its own terms, the option expired on June 14, 1971.
On this date, no contract had been submitted to the appellant
for her approval.

Respondent's failure to submit a purchase

contract until almost a year after the option expired is
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is untimely and fatally defective.
In the lower court, respondent successfully advanced
the proposition that his letter of March 30, 1971, coupled
with his tender of $2,000.00 in June of 1971 exercised the
option.

Beyond blatantly ignoring the requirements of the

Option Agreement, this proposition ignores the tenor of the
letter which is to resolve certain matters preparatory to
the exercise of the option.
[T]here are one or two matters that should be
considered preparatory to my exercising the option
and the delivery of title to a portion of the
land designated by the option.
Analytically, the letter is precatory and cannot bear the
burden of the option's exercise.

Further, respondent does

not now seek to purchase that land described in the linen
which was attached to the ltter, but a smaller parcel.
The only tender of a real estate purchase contract
occurred in May of 1972, eleven months after the option had
expired, and after respondent had been advised of its expiration.

That tender (assuming, arguendo, that it was proper in

every other regard) was untimely.

Respondent contends on

the basis of parol evidence that timeliness, which is material
i.n Utah, is excused; this, even though the Option Agreement had!
been in effect more than nine years when it expired and despite
respondent's stipulation that at no time did appellant request
him to refrain from submitting a contract as required under
the Option Agreement.
In proposing that appellant share in the cost of a
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mating the land described in the Option Agreement, the letter
which the lower court held exercised the option was precatory
and amounted to little more than a counteroffer.

The letter

is also an unintegrated document as it specifically mentions
three enclosures, only one of which is in the record.

The

appellant cannot even recall the other two enclosures, and,
it begs the question, she certainly does not know of their
location.

Another defect in the letter as it appears in the

record is its lack of a signature.
An option is a continuing offer which invites unilat-

eral acceptance.

Acceptance converts the

option into a

mutually binding contract, and the optionee, as well as the
optionor, can be compelled to perform.

The letter that the

lower court found exercised the option is precatory, vague,
ambivalent and contradictory,

Unintegrated and unsigned

in the record before the Court, it is impossible to conceive
that appellant could maintain an action against the respondent
on the basis of that letter.

Indeed, more than a year after

the letter had been drafted, respondent through one of his
attorneys indicated that the land descriptions were still a
minor problem and had to be resolved.

This Court also cannot

ignore the fact that the contract description presented to
the lower court varies from the annexation linen referred to
in the letter.
Ultimately, the lower court held that a real estate
purchase contract presented to Appellant in May of 1972 and
attached to respondent's motion for surmnary judgment and
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me~orandum

of authorities was in conformity with the Option

Agreement and should be signed by Appellant.

Nothing could

be less true. First, the land description in the real estate
purchase contract excludes land in the SE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section
22 and is not in conformity either to the Option Agreement,
or the annexation linen which accompanied the March 30, 1971
letter of "exercise".

Secondly, the real estate purchase

contract ignores the Option Agreement's clear requirement
for the mutual agreement of the parties on many terms, the most
important of which was the amount of land subject to any contract of sale exercising the option.

Thirdly, the real

estate purchase contract was not only untimely submitted, but
the payment schedule recited therein also fails to conform
with the Option Agreement.

Fourth, the real estate purchase

contract recites in its preamble that the Option Agreement
was exercised by the letter and check of March and June of
1971 respectively.

This ignores the clear specification

in the Option Agreement that the option be exercised by the
execution of a contract to purchase lands to be mutually
agreed upon.

Lastly, even assuming the real estate purchase

contract properly described a parcel agreed upon and even
assuming timely tender, the consideration recited therein is,
according to respondent's own sworn admissions, insufficient
to make the purported purchase.
For the foregoing reasons, we strongly feel a
reversal of the decision of the District Court is mandated.
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Respectfully submitted,
ALLEN, THOMPSON, HUGHES & BERLE

~{)~
Michael D. Hughes
Royal K. Hunt
Theodore I. Wittmayer
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Served two copies of the foregoing Brief on James P. Crowley
of Watkins and Campbell, 310 South Main Street, Salt1 Lake
City, Utah, by delivering them to him on this
)'7 ':V'
day of July, 1977.

Royal
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